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
# THE GREAT WAR

THE CAUSES AND THE  
WAGING OF IT

BY  
THEO. D. JERVEY



COLUMBIA, S. C.  
THE STATE COMPANY, PRINTERS  
1917



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*The Author*

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## PREFACE

The following short story of the Great War was prepared by the author in the winter and spring of 1917 when it became probable that the United States would be drawn in through the resumption by Germany of unrestricted submarine activity against neutral shipping and neutral non-combatants. It was thought that in the Southern States, especially, a clear understanding of the causes of the war and a truthful account of the waging of it, up to our entrance in it, might be of some value to those who might not have given much attention to the consideration of such before this time. In this connection, if it was advisable for the representatives of the French and British Governments to indicate to us their mistakes, it was thought by the author appropriate that, while revealing, to some extent, the splendid courage, devoted patriotism and wonderful determination of the Allies to exhibit, at the same time, the evidence of courage, capacity and determination of our foes which a study of the war reveals. Also, if there have been mistakes made by our Allies, as yet not as apparent to them as to some of us, the revelation of such might be as helpful to us and to them as was the recital by them of those they did see and thought necessary to expose to us so clearly.



## CONTENTS

	PAGE
Preface .....	3
Chapter I—The Cause of the War.....	7
Chapter II—The Invasion of France and Belgium....	26
Chapter III—The Saving Power of Tolerance.....	41
Chapter IV—The Recourse to “Germania Triumphans”	53
Chapter V—Verdun and “Der Tag”.....	66
Chapter VI—The Ebbing of the Tide.....	82
Chapter VII—The Submarine Challenge.....	93



## CHAPTER I.

### THE CAUSE OF THE WAR

To obtain in reasonable space and time a definite idea of THE WAR, it might be a mistake for the average man to review the facts which led up to it any further back than 1890, the twentieth year of the German Empire.

Two facts of great significance occurred in that year. The first was the cession by Great Britain to Germany of the island of Heligoland, by which the coast of Germany was immensely strengthened against invasion. The second was the passing of Bismarck, whose resignation was accepted by the young Emperor William the Second, by whom, from that date, the policies of Prussia and the German Empire were directed, by such Chancellors as were willing to become his mouthpiece.

In the administration of Bismarck, the German army did not absolutely control the German State. In the administration of the young Emperor, it at once became apparent, it was increasingly to do so; for that able and resourceful ruler at once identified himself with the aspirations of the army chiefs and, with great tact, drew together the military of Austro-Hungary and Germany through every device which could arouse in them a generous emulation and a fraternization. For this purpose cavalry rides, between Berlin and Vienna and Berlin and Buda Pest, became the order of the day, and accordingly up and down the roads, betwixt the capitals, young German, Austrian and Hungarian officers continually thundered, making a record for man and beast and receiving, from the German Emperor, marked attentions.

It was thus the beginning of an era; but outside of Germany few persons had any idea of the inflation of German ambition; for, indeed, to some extent, it was a period of reaction throughout the world. A few years previously in England, with the shattering of the great Liberal party over the question of Home Rule for Ireland, the government

of the United Kingdom had passed to the Conservatives, under Lord Salisbury, with whom had united the Whigs under Lord Hartington and a few Radicals under the strongest of them, the able, accomplished and prepossessing Joseph Chamberlain, the brass screw manufacturer of Birmingham; for Lord Randolph Churchill, the brilliant Tory Democrat, to whom the party was greatly indebted for its return to power, had been utilized, but not retained.

In Russia, Alexander the Third, after consulting for a short while with Loris Melikoff, entrusted by his father with the preparation of a Constitution, dismissed that liberal statesman and submitted himself to the guidance of the bigot Pobiedonotseff, whose policy it was forcefully to Russianize Finland and Poland.

Even in the United States of America an attempt had been made to get back to conditions from which the great liberal President Rutherford B. Hayes had freed the Republic when, in 1876, he had made the patriotic declaration:—"The flag of the Union floats over independent states and not over conquered provinces."

With the failure of the Federal Force Bill of 1890 to pass into law, the last vestiges of disaffection produced by the War between the States vanished, as the Spanish war eight years later indicated, and possibly, this trust reposed and vindicated in America helped to sustain the belief in the efficacy of such in Great Britain, for, with the resurrection of the great Liberal party in 1905, generous provisions for home rule were granted the conquered republics of South Africa, the bulk of the inhabitants of which were thus knit to the Empire.

That the position of the British Empire in 1890 was not entirely secure was not altogether lost sight of by some observers, although the quarter from which danger was to come, the cession of Heligoland indicated ignorance of; and by one, apparently competent to judge, time was deemed to be all that was essential to render it absolutely secure. In his "Problems of Greater Britain," Sir Charles Dilke, in 1890, forecasted the development of the three great peoples of the world, as they then appeared to him.

Dilke had started life as a Radical; but, being a man of property, besides considerable possessions in England, he had an estate in France. He had been a great traveller; had made some friendships and many acquaintances at the various capitals of Europe; had known Gambetta intimately; and, through this wide knowledge, possessed to an extraordinary degree insight into European questions and the forces which govern their development. Credited with conspicuous clearness of judgment and great linguistic acquirements, as Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, he had been in a position to gauge the movements of European politics, as few men in England could, and a synopsis of his forecast, read at this date, is not without interest. It is as follows:

"The greatest nations of the old world, apart from us, are limited in territory situate in temperate climes, and France and Germany can hope to play but little part in the later politics of the next century, while the future seems to lie between our own people—in the present British empire and in the United States—and the Russians, who, alone among the continental nations of Europe, are in possession of unbounded regions of fertile land, outside of Europe, but in climates in which white men can work upon the soil."

After a comparison of the—at that day and prospective—resources of these three great powers, in which he not unnaturally inclined to the opinion that, upon the whole, the British Empire was holding "her own against the competition of her great daughter, although the United States 'was' somewhat gaining upon her", he affirmed that "both were leaving Russia far astern", and that it was possible that "the growth of Canada and Australia" might "enable the British Empire, not only to continue to rival the United States, but even to reassert her supremacy in most points." His conclusion was:—

"The danger in our path is that the enormous forces of European militarism may crush the old country and destroy the integrity of our Empire before the growth of the newer communities that it contains has made it too strong for the attack. It is conceivable that within the next few years



Great Britain might be drawn into war, and receive in that war, at the hands of a coalition, a blow from which she would not recover, and one of the consequences of which would be the loss of Canada and India and the proclamation of Australian independence."

Within a year from the publication of this forecast and the dismissal of Bismarck appeared a German book, "The Nation Armed", in which some indication of the direction in which the new European political currents were tending, was given.

General Baron Colmar von der Goltz was a great favorite of the young German Emperor William the Second and, later, made by him reorganizer of the Turkish army.

Almost as if in answer to the suggestion of what part Germany might hope to play in the later politics of the next century, in 1891, in "The Nation Armed", he gave his view. It was "Preparedness":—

"To work without relaxation in perfecting our army and our national military organization more and more, will be for us the supremest political wisdom. The increase of our moral force, of that power which decides war, should march with our material progress. We say increase and not maintenance; for moral forces never remain at the same level, they decrease as soon as they cease to increase. It is then necessary, before everything, to convince ourselves and to convince the generation, which we have to educate, that the moment for repose has not come; that the prediction of a supreme struggle, having for result the existence and the grandeur of Germany is no vain chimera issuing from the ambition of some aspiring fools; that the supreme struggle will inevitably burst some day, grave and terrible, as every struggle of nations called upon to inaugurate great political revolutions. This sentiment should lead us to do everything, by example, by word of mouth, by the pen, to strengthen in our hearts and in those of our children our unshakable fidelity to the Emperor, our passionate love of country, our spirit of sacrifice and of abnegation. Under these conditions final victory in the future struggle will not fail to still belong to the German army, which ought to be and remain the armed German nation."

As to the exact nature and scope of the supreme struggle which this great soldier foresaw, he did not enter into the

details; but, as the appetite grows by what it feeds upon, in 1895, in "*Germania Triumphans*", a lesser personage sketched them in vivid colors, although he did conceive the German people might stop half way on the far reaching road he led them to.

"*Germania Triumphans*" is a picture of world conditions from 1900 to 1915. The author says:—

"By the beginning of the Twentieth Century the drawing together of the Germans will have become so dangerous that in England Free Trade will lose a considerable number of partisans. Then the federation of the Britannic territories will be realized. They would form an immense economic territory protected against strange commerce. Of all the continental powers Germany would suffer most from this state of things. The situation would soon become intolerable. A pretext would permit an escape from it. In 1902 the Sultan of Turkey would propose to Germany and Austro-Hungary a custom union. Russia, taking exception to this, would call upon France. In that country there would be division of opinion, some viewing with satisfaction the long expected occasion of a war with Germany, others, that it would be better to come to an understanding with the government of Berlin. This division of opinion would be the consequence of the amelioration of the Franco-German relations. They would have become so amicable that the Emperor William, responding to the invitation of the French government, would have visited the Exposition in 1900. A little while afterwards, he would have even proposed to France a customs union. Despite these conciliating suggestions, no French minister would have dared to affront opinion and conclude the treaty. Negotiations would drag along to the beginning of 1903; finally Russia would declare war and drag France along with her. The latter would gain some victories in the Italian heights, but, in the east, victory would range itself upon the side of Germany, and Paris would be menaced with a new bombardment. Peace would be concluded, but, in the interest of her policy, Germany would demand nothing from France, contenting herself with the statu quo ante, and renewing even her proposal of an alliance. France, convinced this time of the impossibility of reconquering, Alsace Lorraine would be gained by this conduct. Free in the west, the German Emperor would return with all his forces against Russia. His armies would march at once upon Moscow and St. Petersburg. The German fleet would blockade the shores of the Baltic and the

Gulf of Finland. The Austrian army would operate in the region of Kiev and the Turks would take the Caucasus in the rear. Under this triple attack Russia, overwhelmed, would sue for peace, which would be signed at St. Petersburg. Germany, as the principal conqueror, would demand and receive the lion's share. She would acquire the Baltic provinces, Poland, Volhynia, Podolia and the Crimea. Turkey would receive the entire region between the Black and the Caspian Seas. Austria would receive Bessarabia and constrain the Balkan States, upon whom would be imposed German princes, to form with her a Federal State. The German tongue would be proclaimed the official language of Austria, where various agencies would assure the unshakable supremacy of 'Germanism.' Soon after the peace of St. Petersburg, Austria, Turkey and France would send delegates to Berlin to elaborate a vast Zollverein. They would recognize the impossibility of suppressing completely all customs and would adopt two tariffs. One very much reduced would be reserved for the confederated States, the other, prohibitive, would be applied to products exterior to the Zollverein. A customs parliament installed at Berlin would attend to this economic organization; but the division of votes between the different States would assure the supremacy to Germany.

"Her commerce favored by great works, and especially by the prolongation of the railways from Anatolia to the Persian Gulf, would obtain a considerable extension. German agriculture would become flourishing and suffice, thanks to new territories, to all the needs of the population. A period of peace would commence. The Berlin government would institute a series of social reforms and methodically organize German colonization even in Europe. In spite of this privileged situation, affairs would be always difficult with America. German diplomacy would succeed in convincing the French and Italian governments of the necessity of intervention, and, in 1912, the fleets of the three powers would commence hostilities upon the coasts of America. The difficulties would be numberless; but finally the troops of the Union would be defeated and peace signed at Mexico. The allies would receive a considerable war indemnity. Germany would acquire Mexico and Guatemala; France the Central American States. These acquisitions would in the first month of 1913 excite protests from England. The allies would declare war upon her. The German Emperor would be named supreme chief of the combined fleets. First, Great Britain would be starved. Finally the continental

troops would be able to debark; a great battle, directed by the Emperor William in person, would open the route to London, where the allies would enter in triumph. A treaty would still further increase the conquests. Germany would take a great part of the English colonies of Africa and France receive a series of territories very apt otherwise to create for her everywhere immense difficulties. England broken, Germany would finally appear as the universal power (*Deutschland als Weltmacht*). Directly or indirectly the entire world would be subject to her; the supreme task accomplished and, by the end of 1915, the first Pan-German Reichstag would be held at Berlin, where all the German princes of the Confederate States would celebrate the 500th anniversary of the rule of the Hohenzollerns over Brandenburg."

Nothing so marks the bloated pride of this effusion, as the fact that Italy, from first to last, sends no delegates and receives no spoils; but is simply a powder monkey for her great ally.

In the same year in which "Germania Triumphans" was published, the reactionaries in Great Britain who had obtained power upon the refusal of the House of Lords to enact Gladstone's Second Home Rule Bill, came into collision with the government of the United States and were obliged to settle the questions between Great Britain and Venezuela by the arbitration they had refused prior to the interposition of the great Republic; while in the Transvaal, the opponents of President Kruger were greatly weakened by the unsuccessful and indefensible Jameson raid, worked denunciatorially by the German Emperor for all it was worth. Yet his telegram of congratulations to President Kruger, in the light of subsequent developments, seems to have been insincere; for when, four years later, the British government became involved in hostilities with the two small Dutch republics, after an interview with Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary for the Colonies, upon his return to Germany from Windsor, the Emperor declined to see President Kruger, who had evidently come to Europe depending upon his sympathy. So far indeed had he swung round that he was credited with having drawn up a plan of campaign

for the conquest of the two Dutch republics by Great Britain.

This war was not waged, however, without serious protests from within Britain itself; for the leader of the Liberal party, Sir Campbell Bannerman, opposed it earnestly and the present Prime Minister of Great Britain spoke against it, even at the risk of some personal injury at Birmingham, where Chamberlain was supreme; while the great Conservative barrister, Sir Edward Clark, in Parliament subjected Chamberlain's political conduct in connection with it to the severest criticism which could have been directed against it. Kitchener also threw all the weight of his influence in favor of the terms upon which the Boers had offered to surrender and, with Lord Milner's aid, defeated some of the unwise additions which Chamberlain sought to affix; while, upon their return to power, the Liberals, as speedily as possible, secured to the population of South Africa a full measure of Home Rule.

For the time being the German militarists were occupied with grander schemes and, had the German Emperor been able to work up the combination he strove to construct, for the dismemberment and division of China, which his agitation concerning "The Yellow Peril" was evidently aimed at, sufficient opportunity for the energies of Germany might have been provided for, and Europe, for some decades, spared the war which now began to be prophesied as a necessity for German expansion. While as head of the army contingents of Europe in China Germany loomed large; yet, with the return of the Chinese Indemnity by the United States, there was a pricking of the bubble.

The chorus of the German militarists, however, by this time had attracted the attention of a great writer, Andre Cheradame, who in his "*L'Europe at la Question D'Autriche*", brought to notice one later to win great renown, Colonel von Bernardi, former Chief of Staff of the 16th Corps, actually attached to the Grand Staff honored with particular favors, by William the Second, who gave, in a conference concerning the elements of modern war, at a meeting of the Military Society of Berlin, the true formula of German ambitions, as follows:—

"We recognize that the German Empire, newly formed, has not yet attained the possible limit of the extension of her power. Her unification, her rebirth have imposed upon her new and imperious duties which, until now, Prussia has had to fulfill alone. We recognize that her historic mission has not yet terminated, since this mission consists in forming the kernel around which all the dispersed elements of the German race will come to group themselves; in extending her sphere of influence, in order to put it in harmony with her political limits by giving and assuring to 'Germanism' the place which is due her over the whole globe. In order to assure her this place, we should have the courage to occupy ourselves in new ways, where the torch of experience will not come to lighten us, where, apparently, at least, the greatest audacity will be necessary."

What these new ways might be, in which "the greatest audacity" would "be necessary" was in the same year sketched out by R. Felix, in "Germany at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century"; which publication the "All Deutscher Verband" recommended its members to read and discuss. The suggestions were:—

"A great and adroit policy will know how to divide the wars; each war should be conducted by itself, each adversary beaten down while alone. That will be possible with all except with France and Russia, who will certainly hold together; but, according to our military authorities, we can take the two at the same time upon our horns. Even the coalition *a la* Kaunitz, before which Bismarck trembled, and which can be exploited so well at Vienna, can be conquered with our resources alone, if, without hesitation and without scruple, we school ourselves in the war to the greatest violence of action. Then when the triumphant German armies shall occupy the country from the Moldau to the Adriatic, it will be possible to simply expell the non-German inhabitants from this side of the Leith. They could be indemnified, but it would be necessary to clear them out and colonize their country with Germans. On the occasion of happenings as great as these, we should not hesitate to tear away from France and Russia great strips of land, to form the glacis of our east and west frontiers. It would be necessary, besides, to impose, as a condition of peace, that the indigenous inhabitants should abandon these provinces and should be indemnified by the conquered powers. There still we should colonize. That is our idea of the expansion of our

frontiers in Europe. This expansion has become for us a necessity just as much as bread is necessary for our population, which increases so quickly."

It must not be imagined that this propaganda moved without protest from within Germany itself. Not so. The Colmar Journal for instance was outspoken in its condemnation, declaring:—

"Poor fools, say some sceptics. Yes, but dangerous fools, whose theories the German government should occupy itself in publicly denying, and whom it would be well to render powerless, in recalling them from their violences, in fashion calculated to do so, that there is a law within; and without, the necessary of maintaining peace with neighboring countries, whence flows all progress and prosperity for the people."

But what steps would the government be able to take when, from place to place, the Kaiser kept repeating the cryptic, ominous phrase, 'Germany must have her place in the sun'?

What did the Kaiser mean?

Von der Goltz and Bernhardi saw great political convulsions impending in the not distant future. The first counselled unshakable fidelity to the Emperor; the second, great audacity of action. The German army looked to the Emperor and the German Emperor looked to the army and both spoke in mysterious phrases; but those who appealed to the masses spoke in wholly intelligible utterances for, whatever else might be said of "Germania Triumphans" and "Germany at the Commencement of the Twentieth Century" the authors were outspoken in their views. And, in this habit of looking beyond their own boundaries and planning for the annexation of other lands, men of great distinction and of the highest eminence took the lead.

Cardinal Kopp, a personal friend of the Emperor, was an outspoken pan-German. The theologian Lezius, in addressing a gathering of Protestant professors and students of theology, indicated very forcibly just what pan-Germanism meant for the non-Germans in Germany. He said that the Prussian Poles should have but three privileges:—"To pay

taxes, serve in the army and shut their mouths." It is possible, that, at this time, pan-Germanism meant only the incorporation of the Teutonic portion of Austria in the German Empire and, with the accession of 9,000,000 Catholics, the great Catholic prelate, Cardinal Kopp, could well afford to overlook the agitation, "Los von Rom", if it helped to bring about such a desirable condition of affairs, as would make the German Catholics of Germany about on a par with the Protestants, who otherwise were in control.

But something more was needed as a gospel, and that was furnished by a Teutonized Englishman, Houston Stewart Chamberlain.

Chamberlain's book—"The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century", was a work of genius. In the audacity of the conception, the immensity of the grasp, the richness and variety of the knowledge with which he sustained his thesis, it was indeed an epoch-making work. Appearing in Germany at a time, 1901, when the politics of Germany and Great Britain were in accord, the book divided the world and its inhabitants into three classes: First, the Teutonic peoples, that is to say, the Celts, the Teutons, the Slavs and all those races of modern Europe from whom the peoples of modern Europe have sprung. Second, the Jews, who, according to him, constituted a great but alien and dangerous civilization. Third and last, such races as the Turks, Chinese and the inhabitants of the Mediterranean littoral, whom he designated as the people of the Chaos, hardly worth considering. The argument of the book was that the Teutons were just beginning to develop their civilization; that it was to be a Christian civilization, freed from the dogma of the churches; that Christ was not of Jewish birth, but in all probability of Teutonic origin; and that his birth was, in a sense, the beginning of history.

Lord Redesdale, who translated the book into English in 1912, declared that "the leit motif which runs through the whole book is the assertion of the superiority of the Teuton family to all the other races of the world." While the work of a scholar, the principle it sought to inculcate was as old as time, the principle of caste. Yet it was not easily detected; for in it was not to be found any of the



heady, frothy stuff which filled the pages of "Germania Triumphant" and "Germany at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century." It held out a hand to the English, the Irish and the French, which, in part, was also extended to the Spaniards, the Italian and the Russian of the northernmost portions of their respective countries, if they would only throw in their lot. Not even all of the Jews were excluded; for the strictures upon Jews in general were in contrast to the encomiums showered upon the Sephardin Jews of Spain. Yet it was to the Teutons that all must look for salvation. They inferentially were "The Sons of God", even if, in some instances, they had "looked upon the daughters of men" and seen that "they were fair."

A Daedalus might soar to such heights and return to earth; but when Nietzsche attempted such a flight, his floppings soon became so frantic as to draw from his fellow German, Treitschke, the cold and acrid suggestion that he was afflicted with "*folie des grandeurs*."

Was Nietzsche alone so afflicted? Were not the bulk of the upper classes infected, even if the better balanced brains of Cardinal Kopp, Baron von der Golst, General Bernhardt and Emperor William made, each, in his own way, a practical application?

There was a suspicion that the latter had, about the time of the Boer war, effected some kind of understanding with the statesman who was thought to be the coming man in Great Britain, whereby, in consideration of a free hand in South Africa, upon the death of the Emperor Francis Joseph, a free hand would be allowed Germany in Central Europe in the absorption of the German part of Austro-Hungary. But Francis Joseph with his lengthened life stood in the way, and so new plans were evolved.

The defeat of Russia at the hands of Japan in 1905, increased the confidence of Germany immensely; yet the debt which Japan owed to President Roosevelt was enormous, for had the war continued much longer nothing short of revolution in Russia could have saved Japan. Stopped as the war was, however, the prestige of Russia was seriously impaired and knowing, as no others could know, how immensely superior in every military way Germany was to

Japan, the German Staff realized that, with Turkey at her heels and the British fleet pledged not to interfere, nothing could stop the Teuton march through Central Europe. Such being the condition of affairs, it was not the wisest statesmanship to have alarmed Great Britain with the continual growth of the German navy; for, coupled as it was with the declarations proceeding from the Emperor, it was disquieting. In the year 1900 the Emperor publicly proclaimed at a great function:—

“Our German Fatherland—May it in the future become, through the co-operation of princes and peoples, their lords and their Burghers, as powerful, as strongly united and as extraordinary as the universal Roman Empire, so that in the future, one may say, not as in the old time: *Civis Romanus sum*; but *Ich bin ein Deutscher Burgher!*”

Two years later, at Aix la Chapelle, the note was even louder:

“It is to the Empire of the world, that the German genius aspires.”

If ever a work was calculated to fan a great flame, the Teutonized Englishman’s “Foundations of the Nineteenth Century” was so constructed. Here were a people of the very greatest intelligence, industry and docility led by an aristocracy whose only aspiration was war, who, after overthrowing in succession two of the four great continental powers of Europe, saw the third overthrown by a people inferior to themselves, and were now invited by a literary genius, emanating from the fourth, to lead the world. But if Houston Stewart Chamberlain was inviting Germany to lead the world, Joseph Chamberlain was too thorough an Englishman not to be perturbed by these recurring practical illustrations of preparation for the carrying into effect of Houston Stewart Chamberlain’s doctrine. If Germany had only been willing to make some concessions to British alarm over her fleet development, British politicians might not have been drawn toward France as distinctly, as from this time they were; for with Salisbury’s death Joseph Chamberlain could no longer restrain an ambition to lead the country.

A man of parts and force, with a will and opinion of his

own and not enough culture to fly over the heads of the rank and file of the British gentry and mercantile classes, Joseph Chamberlain, manufacturer and family man, with his fine presence and good taste, suited the Conservatives more completely than the scholarly bachelor, Arthur Balfour, the titular leader of the party, and, almost as if to dignify "Germania Triumphans", about the time prophesied for such action by that publication, dramatically resigned office and started a campaign against Free Trade.

France and England drew closer together and the Moroccan Question took shape.

Just before starting for Morocco in 1905, the German Emperor indicated the effect of Houston Stewart Chamberlain's book in furthering the great ambition, by means of a much more moderate statement of policies, by asserting at Bremen:—

"If later we must speak in history of a universal domination by the Hohenzollern, of a universal German Empire, this domination must not be established by military conquest. . . . God has called us to civilize the world. We are the missionaries of human progress."

This said, he sailed for Tangiers, where he proclaimed the independence of the Moroccan Sultan and, after forcing the resignation of French Minister of Foreign Affairs, brought about a European Conference at Algeciras; where his government, after supporting his contentions, finally accepted a compromise, whereby the political control of Morocco by France and Spain was increased, in consideration of gain elsewhere by Germany. The accommodation was necessary, as Germany found all the Powers against her save Austria. Three years later she buckled Austria tightly to her by the support she gave that country in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina against the protest of Russia and, as in the year previous, 1907, the Anglo-Russian accord over Persia had been established, Europe was now divided into two camps. Still in Great Britain there were protests against this close accord of democratic Britain and autocratic Russia; for many of the Liberals had enthusiastically applauded the challenging cry of their

Prime Minister, upon the arbitrary dissolution of the Duma by the Czar of Russia:—"The Duma is dead—long live the Duma"! And so, when in 1911 the Moroccan issue became so acute that it was deemed necessary to put up some official to speak for the British Government, it was not the then Prime Minister Asquith, nor the Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, both Liberals of a somewhat Conservative type; but the Radical Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lloyd George, who warned Germany, that in pressing France too far, she must expect to reckon with Great Britain. The hint was taken and a trade effected whereby a French Protectorate of Morocco was recognized by Germany; for what, not a few Germans thought, was too cheap a return, in the acquisition of French territory in the Congo. In the same year Italy by her invasion of Tripoli indicated that the bonds which held her to the Triple Alliance were not of the strongest and, with the imprecations of both sides hurled at her, fought for her own hand in the ever widening game of grab.

In the next year, 1912, came the event which precipitated the world war, the combination of the Balkan peoples against Turkey, the result of which was such an astounding surprise to all the chancelleries of Europe, that prompt action was necessary, if schemes which had been hatching for years were not to be abandoned.

By 1912 the Germans, or the great mass of those who led them, had become thoroughly convinced of their innate superiority to the rest of mankind. So widely spread and firmly established was this conviction, that it was just as clearly discernible in those, who had been chased out of Germany and only in more tolerant countries been permitted to exercise these superior qualities, as in those who, within that great country, proclaimed in more intemperate language what Trietschke, Hummel, Woltman, Wirth, Haartmann and others had preached for years. But, in 1912, two books appeared in style quite different; but each in its way striving to steel the Germans to the launching of the "Preventative Offensive War," which they were almost ready for. The first of these by Paul Rohrbach has been translated by an eminent German scholar under the title

"German World Policies." It is temperately worded, well argued and supported by illustrations which powerfully assist the argument.

Of the sincerity of this author, there is no occasion to doubt and, if the world could only accept his major premise, there would be no escape from the inferences he draws therefrom. The premise is as follows:

"We start very consciously with the conviction, that we have been placed in the arena of the world to work out moral perfection, not only for ourselves, but for all mankind."

Here we have in simple phrase Houston Stewart Chamberlain's Teutonic superiority making its inevitable advance and narrowed to the German people. Of what avail is it, after stating the above, to declare that the Anglo-Saxons are compelled "to make their decision between the two following propositions":—

"Will they reconcile themselves to seeing our interests in the world maintain themselves by the side of their own and come to an agreement with us concerning them? Or will they fight with force of arms to remain the sole mistress of the world?"

Is it not apparent, to the most peace-loving disposition, that if, what the Germans are conscious of, viz., that they "have been placed in the arena of the world to work out moral perfection for all mankind", is true, it is necessary for the Germans to obtain the mastery of the world to accomplish their aim?

That, in its last analysis, it is a gamble for power, is established by Mr. Rohrbach himself, when he says:

"We must, therefore, ask ourselves two questions: In the first place, how much can we STAKE on the endeavor to obtain for the German idea the greatest possible influence in the world; and, secondly, what are our national resources with which we can reckon politically; and, finally, what are the encumbrances and liens which are placed on them?"

Houston Stewart Chamberlain, the great Prophet of Modern Germany, has declared that the conception which

Christendom has had of Christ is erroneous. So did Mahomet, in his day. Houston Stewart Chamberlain has in preparation now, what is actually the German Koran. And just as the followers of Mahomet came, so the Germans will come with, in one hand their Koran and in the other the sword. Grant that it is a far better Koran than that of Mahomet, there is no escaping the conviction, that the scheme is to impose German Kultur on the world by force. That it is a war upon democracy by fanatics, led by an autocrat.

The second book was by an author to whom allusion has been made before, General Friedrich von Bernhardi.

The main difference between this book and that of Paul Rohrback lay in the callous candor with which Bernhardi discussed matters in "Germany and the Next War."

Taking as his text the declaration of Heraclitus of Ephesus, "War is the father of all things", Bernhardi summoned to his aid every power of his mind to establish it as an irrefutable doctrine.

In four chapters entitled—(1) "The Right to Make War": (2) "The Duty to Make War": (3) "Germany's Historic Mission": (4) "World Power or Downfall"—he aimed to expand a quotation from the German historian Treitschke—

"The great elector laid the foundations of Prussia's power by successful and deliberately incurred wars. Frederick the Great followed in the steps of his glorious ancestor, and none of the wars which he fought had been forced upon him,"—

while the animus of the book is displayed in a ruthless disregard of all the moralities of civilization such as perhaps never has, since the Christian era, appeared in print.

Here is how he speaks of France:—

"In one way or another we must square our account with France if we wish for a free hand in our international policy. This is the first and foremost condition of a sound German policy, and since the hostility of France, once for all, cannot be removed by peaceful overtures, the matter must be settled by force of arms. France must be so com-

pletely crushed that she can never again come across our path."

By German apologists, it has been claimed, that General Bernhadi's book was better known outside of Germany than within; but we have seen, that the same views of the irrepressible conflict and necessary acts of the greatest audacity had been preached by him for over a decade. Besides, in a later amplification of his ideas, entitled—"Our Future—A Word of Warning"—he asserts:

"My book, 'Germany and the Next War,' has been reviewed by the press of all civilized nations. It has been translated into English and Swedish, and it has met in nearly all countries with unfavorable and frequently with malicious criticism. That has been its fate particularly in England and in the press influenced by that country. On the other hand, 'Germany and the Next War' has found support and recognition in many quarters, and particularly in the patriotic circles of the German Fatherland."

He also declared that upon being asked to popularize his book by offering it to the public at a moderate price, he gladly did so.

In 1913 General Bernhardt published his second book at one-fifth the price of the first, of which it is only a brief development brought up to date.

Claiming that "—No other nation can point to achievements comparable to those of Germany . . . No nation exists which thinks at the same time so clearly and so historically as does the German; none is more free from prejudice,"—he illustrates his freedom from these trammels by the following:—

"It can really not reasonably be expected that Germany, with her 65,000,000 inhabitants and her world-wide trade, should allow herself to be treated on a footing of equality with France with her 40,000,000 inhabitants. It can really not be expected that Germany should allow 45,000,000 inhabitants of Great Britain (Celtic Scotchmen, Welshmen and Irishmen, side by side with Germanic Englishmen), to act as arbiters to the States of the old world and to exercise an absolute supremacy on the seas."

And yet he rests the structure of his argument upon two pillars, neither of which are of purely Germanic origin, for one Kant was of Scotch extraction and the other Darwin, an Englishman. Indeed it is upon English authority that he rests his claim.

"Wherever we look in nature we find that war is a fundamental law of development. This great verity, which has been recognized in past ages, has been convincingly demonstrated in modern times by Charles Darwin. He proved that nature is ruled by an unceasing struggle for existence, by the right of the stronger, and that this struggle, in its apparent cruelty, brings about a selection, eliminating the weak and unwholesome. . . . It may, of course, happen that biologically weak nations combine, form a majority and vanquish a nation of greater vitality. However, history teaches us that their success will be only temporary. Greater vitality will vindicate itself and the united opponents will decline by abusing their power."

Fully convinced that the Boers were held as part of the British Empire solely by force, he used them as an illustration. It never occurred to this grim soldier that a people could be held by trust reposed. To him, the history of the United States was a sealed book. It never dawned upon him, that admitting the truth of many of the criticisms, which he and other moulders of German thought showered upon England, and which could, in a somewhat fuller measure than we of the United States would care to allow, be directed against us also; yet, in its essence, that which divided our political philosophy from the modern political philosophy of Germany as expounded by Bernhardt and his school was that ours had some scruples, theirs none.

The German militarists taught that to win Germany must stick at nothing. Subsequent events were to show that had Germany only observed some scruples, she must have emerged from the contest greatly strengthened; but, by her ruthless course from the outset, she continually raised up enemies against her, unwilling to submit to the doctrine, that her necessities permitted her to hack her way through the world to her place in the sun, without any regard to the neutral throats she felt impelled to slit in her progress.



## CHAPTER II.

### THE INVASION OF FRANCE AND BELGIUM

The overthrow of Turkey in 1913, by the Balkan Confederation, was, to the militarists, and savants of Prussia, as General Bernhardt truly put it, "A Terrible Awakening." Neither he, nor any other German military authority, nor, for the matter of that, any European authority, believed for one instant, that the 700,000 Turkish troops, trained by that experienced Prussian soldier, von der Golst, could not be depended upon, to account for the 500,000, or at the most 600,000 men, which represented about all that Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro could bring into the field, even if the Balkan peoples could be brought to act together, which was deemed an impossibility. But, what was deemed impossible happened. Turkey was overthrown and across, not only Austria's path to Saloniki, but also Germany's future path to Bagdad and the Persian Gulf, stretched the Balkan Confederation, capable of throwing into line of battle half a million of fierce, trained fighters, conquerors of the Turks, the light of battle still in their eyes, the lust of battle for liberty still in their souls. If the "Drang nach Osten" was still to be retained as a policy, Serbia must immediately be barred from the Adriatic, and this despite the efforts of Russia, Austria backed by Germany accomplished; for neither France nor Great Britain was ready to engage in war to further expansions, they had warned as dangerous. The plan worked, Serbia failing to get what she expected was reluctant to deliver to Bulgaria what Serbian troops had conquered. Bulgaria insisted. Greece sustained Serbia, for a consideration. War followed. Roumania intervened and defeated Bulgaria became permanently embittered. Another year passed. Then came the bloody incident of the assassination of the Crown Prince of Austria and his wife. The opportunity was too good not to be worked to its utmost possibility, and upon Serbia demands were made, which practically ignored her independence, and yet, which Ger-

many insisted could not be brought before a European convocation of Powers. In vain the diplomats of Britain and the masses of Germany pled for this Conference, the Rulers of Germany were obdurate and it is for this reason that upon their heads justly rests all the blood that has been shed. The masses of Germany were for peace; but to almost all successful Germany, her military men, her savants, her journalists and clergy, the captains of her industry, which with leaps and bounds had won the admiration of the world of trade, the hour seemed striking. They had an excuse for war and they were prepared. The masses were as docile as the leaders were ardent. In men, material and temper the Nation seemed ripe for a great struggle and those at the summit probably realized, that, if they were not prepared to utilize the great instruments which had been fashioned since forty years, others were at hand who were. The German Emperor may have preferred peace obtained by a threat, rather than war in actuality; but in considering whether he should threaten war, looking back upon his own career, he must have remembered, that he had shown himself an undutiful son and must not be surprised if his own son showed himself such also. Indeed recent events had indicated that very son exerting an influence against his father's mouthpiece, the Chancellor. There might then be war within, if there was not war without. On the other hand, a firm front might again win a peaceful victory over Russia, as it had done six years prior, a conquest distinctly permitted by the great Apostle of War, Bernhardt. In addition, was it right, for his own people's sake, to risk the replacing of the "homme d' affaires" with the "fou furieux"? It was not only the military who were for war, the upper classes were almost a unit for it. They had been taught for years that other people were denying to them their divine right, as the most perfect people of the world, to redeem it with their rule and, for the unprepared people of Great Britain and the United States, they had something like contempt, not having the least conception of the quickening power of voluntary service.

It may be honestly believed that the commercial rivalries of the European nations and especially Germany and Eng-

land contained in themselves the germ, which would have inevitably led to conflict if not adjusted in time; but as to what actually precipitated the conflict of 1914, it is useless to consider anything, but the declaration of Germany herself, in which Great Britain is found acquitted of all blame and put on a par with herself in efforts to preserve peace; for on August 1st, 1914, in the declaration of war handed to Russia by the German Ambassador appears the following:

"The Imperial Government has tried its best, from the beginning of the crisis, to bring it to a peaceful solution. Yielding to a desire which had been expressed to him by his Majesty, the Emperor of Russia, his Majesty, the Emperor of Germany, IN ACCORD WITH ENGLAND, WAS ENGAGED IN ACCOMPLISHING THE ROLE OF MEDIATOR BETWEEN THE CABINETS OF VIENNA AND PETROGRAD, when Russia, without awaiting the result of this mediation, proceeded to the mobilization of its forces by land and sea. . . . His Majesty, the Emperor, my august sovereign, in the name of the empire, accepts the challenge and considers himself in the state of war with Russia."

The German Ambassador and his Government were therefore witnesses to England's claim, that she sought peace, until it became their interest to dispute it.

But having announced the intention of warring against Russia for declining to demobilize at her command, why did not Germany bend the bulk of her efforts to that task?

It is true such a decision might have involved the resignation of the heads of the Military Staff, who made the invasion of France through Belgium a sine qua non of their retention of office; but even so, their places could have been supplied, as they subsequently were, when their incompetence had been established.

With all its military advantages, the invasion of Belgium was a terrific mistake.

The wise, the politic, the statesmanlike course would have been to have made no demand whatsoever upon France or Belgium, and if the latter country, under such conditions, had been crazy enough to have attacked Germany, that country would have gained more than she possibly could attain by an advance into Belgium before such.

With Belgium out of the war or in it on her own initiative, it would have been exceedingly difficult for any British government, and especially a Liberal Cabinet, dependent upon Radicals and Laborites, as well as Liberals, to have brought Great Britain in, and even if they had, to have forced her people to have contributed one-tenth the effort Germany's course engendered. France would have been constrained to have attacked Germany through Alsace and Lorraine and upon the first move of Belgium or France or England into Belgium, Liege and the powerful line of the Meuse could have been promptly seized and held.

Looking at it, as a practical question, if not all of Naboth's vineyard would have been acquired, the very best portion of it could, at a trifling price compared to what it cost Ahab in the blood of his own people.

This view is sustained by high military authority and German at that. To quote:—

"Germany's western frontier is exceedingly favorable for defense. Here a weak army can hold its own during a long time and inflict heavy losses upon the enemy. If the aggressor should endeavor to avoid the powerful Rhine front by marching through Belgium or through Switzerland, he would raise further enemies against himself and thus strengthen Germany."

To go further into details, Great Britain's obligations with regard to the French coast would not have been involved by the operations of the German fleet and armies against Russia and, even if the march to St. Petersburg would have taken much longer, than the estimated romp to Paris; yet if Finland could have been set afire with revolution, the best ally among the neutrals, that Germany could have hoped to have drawn in, might have been secured; for Sweden naturally inclined to Germany.

Another reason for this course was that in the French armies, which lay between Germany and Paris, in the opinion of the German Staff, they were destined to meet the best soldiers which could be arrayed against them; while, with regard to the Russians, it had been stated by one high in their councils—

"Incapacity among the officers was general and hopeless. Again and over again victory was left to an inferior enemy. The Russo-Turkish and the Russo-Japanese wars have proved that the Russian army can be defeated by smaller numbers."

Lastly considered from the moral standpoint, as to what was due to those whom they had influenced to enter the gamble with them, an invasion of Courland would have saved Galicia and enabled Austria, even if her armies had been unable to reach Odessa, to have so intervened between Roumania and Russia as to have possibly brought in Roumania upon the side of the Central Powers, for a consideration, which the territory taken from Roumania by Russia in 1878 might have furnished. This, in its turn, might have brought in Bulgaria and Turkey earlier than they came in, and kept Italy neutral to the end.

It is true that none of these Allies, under these conditions, would have become the abject dependents upon Germany that they have since. That is the real reason why a course having so many advantages was not adopted; for the conquest of her Allies no less than the conquest of her opponents was a necessary part of the program of Germany's rulers. The wrong done Belgium, through the unprovoked invasion, was declared by the Chancellor done of necessity, but subsequent declarations, as well as the negotiations with Great Britain, indicated other aims, among them the colonies of France, whom Germany believed, and not without reason, incapable of withstanding the assault she was prepared to make, and whom, if not prostrated thereby to the last extremity, would, with Belgium, be deprived of the means of making munitions of war. At the same time, Germany's grand total would be increased by exactly the sum taken and, if the United States could be bluffed into an embargo, the war was won.

Considered from a purely utilitarian view, the plan was promising and in the execution it was well carried out.

The French were to be almost invited into Alsace. No defence worth considering was to be made to their advance. It was in upper Lorraine, in Luxemburg and on the Belgian

frontier, that Germany massed her troops and it was upon Belgium that she moved in force. By so doing she arrayed against herself the sentiment of the civilized world and all the force which Belgium could bring to bear upon the situation. That, however, disturbed her but slightly, for she counted it as but six army corps of an inferior quality. The British fleet, mobilized by Winston Churchill, without law and at his own risk, however, was a most unexpected and disturbing fact; for, with the exception of eight first-class cruisers and a few auxiliaries, the German fleet was completely bottled.

Again, not even the ruthless precepts they had had instilled into them, line upon line and precept upon precept, could, at the outset, bring the Germans upon Belgium with the necessary ferocity. The Belgian defense of Liege was gallant and touched to the quick all that was best and bravest in the foe. General Leman and his heroic 30,000 were entitled to all the praise they earned in withstanding the German advance. The Belgian played his part better than the nameless French General who, about the same time, was entrusted with the advance into Alsace with about the same number of troops. Liege was, however, captured after a short resistance and the French advance in Alsace checked.

Meanwhile, well posted on the outskirts of Belgium, awaiting the British expeditionary force, General Joffre prepared his line of battle to meet the great shock he knew was impending.

If in him, the French did not produce a genius, they yet, in the estimation of the great Kitchener, had in command not only a great general, but also a great man. And Kitchener's opinion was of the highest; for he, of all the mighty men, at that time, foresaw the full duration of the struggle and moved England to meet it in the measure with which she since has done so. Speaking for the Ministry he said, we must prepare for a struggle of at least three years. If at that time, we shall not have achieved victory, others will take our places.

As seen by the Military Correspondent of that paper which was to be his greatest critic, the situation was thus put:—

“In the aggregate, France and her friends have on their hands twenty German army corps, and let us say eight divisions of cavalry. If each army corps has a reserve division with it—as we must prudently assume until we have evidence to the contrary—the aggregate strength of the enemy is approximately 1,275,000. The combatant strength is 783,000 rifles, 65,000 sabres, 4,416 guns and light howitzers and 1,488 machine guns. For the main offensive stroke, however, only seventeen army corps are available, with an aggregate approximate strength of a million. We need not at present concern ourselves about the reserve field armies which are forming in the rear. Our immediate task is to meet and defeat the first line, with the certain knowledge that if we can even do no more than arrest its offensive, the German plan of campaign will collapse. There is no reason why we should not do it. France and the allies now at her side can place in line more men, sabres, guns and rifles than this German host. With Antwerp, Namur and Verdun strongly held, with the south apparently secure and with masses of reserves behind in strong supporting position, there is no reason why the French should not resist victoriously and drive the enemy back.”

In this interesting statement, we see the English conception of strategy. To minds like Lord Northcliffe's and his sportsmanlike advisers, it is merely, more power behind and a bull like push, wherein “the hardest head bears longest oot.” But, to the Germans and the Yankees, it is first, to so dispose the force as to have it fall where it is least expected or resistance weakest. To throw it relentlessly; but in place of only victoriously resisting and driving the enemy back, to overpower and crush, without counting the cost; and to relentlessly press the retreating foe.

Sound as this last military conception is, to Captains like Lee and Joffre, it offers opportunities for good troops, even if in inferior numbers, to be used with effect, and so Joffre proved.

Without regarding, in the slightest, the suggestion of The London Times that—

"the chief danger was that the Belgian field army might be overwhelmed by von Emmich's army and a corps of cavalry, which have probably by this time crossed the Meuse close to the Dutch frontier, and will be soon marching on Louvainne."—

General Joffre ordered General Pau, who had succeeded the incompetent French General, who had conducted the first invasion, to again advance into Alsace. Higher up Generals Dubail and Castlenau also advanced. The combined armies may have amounted to 300,000 men. Higher up again, General Ruffey was posted on the Meuse above Verdun, with something like 160,000 men and above him General Langle de Cary with about the same number at Sedan.

Well into Belgium and, lying at right angle with the angle at Namur, was General Larenzac with 120,000 men, his right wing at about Dinant, his left at Charleroi, from which position north of the Sambre to Mons, stretched that portion of the British army 85,000 strong, which under General French had reached the field in time to participate in the great battle now impending. Beyond in Belgium, the main portion of the Belgian army, reduced by the defense of Liege to about 100,000, were retiring upon Antwerp and, with some French Territorials and the garrisons of Namur and Maubeuge, made up all told for the Allies probably 900,000 men.

Using a portion of his force to hold back the Belgians and guard his lines and two corps for a wide enveloping movement against the British left, von Kluk was preparing to overwhelm and destroy it, and operating as he was, with fully 300,000 troops, he was thus able to bring to bear upon the British front at least 130,000 men to hold them with their attacks, until the 80,000 making their wide sweeping movement could attack their flank and rear.

Upon General Larenzac's army of 120,000 posted behind the fortress of Namur, with some support from its garrison and a portion of the Belgian army, General Bulow, with his entire army, 200,000, and half of von Hauson's army, 100,000, was moving. Opposite the armies of Langle de Cary and Ruffey, totalling 320,000, were the remainder of von Haussen's army, the entire army of the Duke of Wur-



temburg and half of the army of the Crown Prince, probably 500,000 men. Further south again, Prince Ruprecht of Bavaria commanded about 200,000, stretching down from Luxemburg into Lorraine. While, with probably no more than 120,000, General von Heeringen was retiring in Alsace, as he defended his retreat. A grand total of something like 1,420,000, which independent cavalry brought fully up to a million and a half of troops, directed upon France by the German Chief of Staff von Moltke and designed to crush her completely, before the slower mobilization of Russia could make her influence felt upon the eastern frontier.

General Joffre's plan to meet the situation, as far as he realized it, was with the 295,000 he had in Belgium, to hold his left flank firmly in place, while, with a thrust at the centre of the German line, made as their weaker left flank was simultaneously bent back, to envelop the German left, seize the bridges of the Rhine and separate the center and left from the right, whose line of communications would thereby be cut.

General Joffre failed to effect his purpose. In the first place, not only were the German armies in the North in far greater force than had been estimated; but the French Commander in Chief was not served by all his subordinates with that ability, which alone could have carried into effect his plan. Generals Pau and Dubail advancing against General von Heeringen drove the Germans back to the Rhine in Alsace; while General Castelnau, at the same time, penetrated well into Lorraine driving before him the German forces; but, when he was well in, Prince Ruprecht of Bavaria, heavily reinforced, came down upon his left flank and striking the somewhat exhausted French army of 120,000 men with something like 200,000 crushed in the flank and sent it staggering back to the frontier, with casualties amounting to 40,000 and saved only from complete destruction by the ability displayed by its general in extricating it and the conspicuous ability of one of its corps commanders, General Foch, together with the splendid behavior of the corps he led.

Higher up in the Belgian Ardennes, the thrust in also failed; for, while Langle de Cary succeeded, Ruffey was

only saved from a disaster, by the superior generalship again of a corps commander, Sarrail; while, on the angle, where Larenzac was posted, Namur giving way in a few hours, that general fell back, exposing the right flank of the British army and forcing it, after stubborn fighting, to retreat in the face of the enormous numbers threatening it.

Thus, in the first great shock of battle, the Germans had been completely victorious and with the greatest vigor they pressed the retreating armies. The French had been forced out of Belgium, Alsace and Lorraine and all along the line French territory was being added to the two-thirds or more of valuable Belgian territory in the control of the Germans.

On to Paris the victorious German right flank was swinging with apparently resistless force, to the complete bewilderment of the experts calling out in the press for an inquiry as to why Namur fell.

But to achieve this great success in the West, through their enormous concentration there, the Germans had been forced to undergo some risks upon the eastern frontiers, along the doubly rectangular line of which they had disposed only six army corps, viz., 80,000 on the extreme eastern front, 40,000 on the northern boundary of Russian Poland and 120,000 on the western boundary, the nearest point which threatened Berlin.

As Austria, in addition to the 120,000 men which made up her punitive expedition against Serbia, was known to have assembled a vast army in Galicia for the invasion of Russia, the above forces were, however, considered sufficient.

The Austrian army which assembled in Galicia has been estimated at from 800,000 to 1,250,000. It consisted of an army of six or seven corps at Cracow under command of the archduke Joseph Ferdinand; an army of about the same strength under General Dankl at the fortress Przemyśl; and another under General Auffenberg at Lemberg of about the same size; while a smaller army of only three corps was posted in the rear near the Carpathians.

As opposed, the Russians, under General Ivanoff, consisted of four armies, one at Ivangorod under General Evert and another at the river Bug under General Plehve, each numbering about 200,000 men; while at Lutsk was General

Russky, with possibly 300,000 men, and on the Dniester, further south, General Brusiloff with about the same number. In the northern sphere, the Russians under Generals Rennenkamp and Samsonoff, with armies of 120,000 each, were moving on East Prussia.

By faulty manoeuvring the inefficient Austrian commanders succeeded in bringing about a condition under which General Auffenberg's army was subjected alone to the attacks of Generals Russky and Brusiloff. Extending on the border from Brody to Tarnopol, it was there smitten upon the two wings and driven back with heavy losses to a front extending well in Galicia from Lemburg to Halicz. At the same time, the two smaller armies of the Germans in East Prussia were driven back with losses and East Prussia overrun by the invaders. This was something that Germany thought should be at once corrected and General Hindenberg, at the head of about 180,000 troops, was dispatched against General Samsonoff, whose forces had been increased to about 200,000. Just what portion of the Western German force was withdrawn from France is not certain; but with at least a million and a half of troops remaining the German army invading France stretched from Belfort up above Verdun and thence across the river Meuse, to the river Somme, at which point, the British, upon the flank the Germans were seeking most determinedly to turn, were slightly relieved, through a vigorous thrust on their right by General Maunoury, one of General Larenzac's corps commanders, which drove back the Prussian Guard. Yet, while a brilliant action, this was but a slight affair when contrasted with the overwhelming defeat of General Samsonoff in East Prussia, where General Hindenberg, catching the unfortunate Russian commander tangled amid the Mazurian lakes, completely routed his army, capturing numbers of prisoners and destroying a mass of men and material.

In spite, therefore, of the severe losses sustained by the Austrians under Auffenberg and the punitive expedition against Serbia, with something like 150,000 French, Belgian, British and Russian prisoners, swept in from both frontiers, the German armies invading France prepared to overwhelm

the French and British, making their last stand within twenty miles of Paris, towards which still came von Kluk driving everything before him.

On the sea, too, Beatty's brilliant dash into the Bight of Heligoland had been followed by three engagements, which indicated, that if, by the foresight and skill of Winston Churchill and Prince Louis of Battenberg, almost the entire German fleet had been bottled, the few afloat were officered and manned by the ablest fighters the British had encountered since the days of Decatur and Hull.

Steaming boldly into the harbor at Zanzibar, the German cruiser had caught the inferior British cruiser *Pegasus* at anchor, put her out of action and escaped without injury; the auxiliary cruiser *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosser* had gallantly sustained the fire of the British cruiser *Highflyer* until she sank under it; and the *Cap Trafalgar* had fought a creditable action with the *Carmania*, until she too was sunk. But the much heavier British cruiser *Hampshire*, somewhere off the Chinese coast, had come in contact with a vessel or vessels which had sent her limping into port with considerable damage and many wounded; while, in the Indian Ocean the *Emden*, in the Atlantic the *Karlsruhe*, and in the Pacific the *Gneisenau*, *Scharnhorst*, *Nurnberg*, *Dresden* and *Leipsick* were sinking British shipping in numbers sufficient to excite great and unreasonable discontent with the branch of the service which was admirably handled; but unfortunately could neither be omniscient nor omnipotent.

Meanwhile preparing for what he knew would be the decisive battle of the war, the great French Commander in Chief, General Joffre, ordered General Castelnau to fortify and hold a ridge to the east of Nancy on the Lorraine front, known as the Grand Couronne, and, with about 100,000 men and an abundance of artillery, General Castelnau took up his position there; while Generals Dubail and Pau fell back, withdrawing from Alsace to a more easily defended line, from Belfort, north; and, from the troops which had invaded Alsace and others which had meanwhile been gathered, General Joffre prepared two new armies, which he placed respectively under the command of Generals Foch

and Maunoury, in rear of the continuation of his line, stretching from Verdun to Paris.

To General Sarrail in place of General Ruffey he entrusted the defence of Verdun. West of Sarrail was the army of General Langle de Cary. Farther west still, in the concentric dip of the line, the new army entrusted to Foch. Then came General d'Esperey, who had replaced General Larenzac. Just below Paris was General French in command of the British army, which had been reinforced and in spite of its losses was as strong as at the outset and possibly stronger. West again the other new army under Maunoury.

Flushed with his success in the great battle of Metz, Prince Ruprecht of Bavaria, with some 300,000 men, assaulted the Grand Couronne; but under the fire of the French artillery, splendidly handled, his troops were mowed down in swaths, as, in solid formation, they advanced under the eye of their Emperor with intrepid courage to death and destruction, day after day; and, in the first days of September, General Joffre published his inspiring Order of the Day and the Battle of the Marne was on.

Upon the extreme German right, General von Kluk, within twenty miles of Paris, and not believing it possible that the forces, which for two weeks he had been driving before him from the Belgian frontier, had any more fight in them, deflected his course to the left and pushed in at the centre, leaving but a single corps to guard his exposed flank.

It was the opportunity General Joffre had been waiting for and, upon General von Kluk's exposed flank, Maunoury fell with fury, forcing the German general to again alter his disposition and face about to meet the assault, which was sweeping before it the force he had left to guard his flank. As he drew back the British army advanced and the French army on the right of the British also pressed forward against von Bulow, who had dispatched a portion of his force to assist von Kluk in the attempt to outflank Maunoury. This change of movement from south to west, on the right of the German line, is said by the experts to

have unduly stretched the German line just east of von Bulow's left wing, and, against the thinned line there General Foch pressed resistlessly; and to him, of all the generals engaged, the greatest credit is given for the great victory which was won in the German retreat. But, as it was Maunoury's flank attack which stopped General von Kluk's attack on the centre, induced him to attempt instead to flank the attacker, and General Bulow to aid by a movement also to the rear and right, it is not strange that many give Maunoury as much credit as Foch.

To Sarraill, who with inferior forces pressed back the Crown Prince and saved Verdun, also much praise is given. To d'Esperey some, and also to Castelnau, whose successful defense of the Grand Couronne redeemed the defeat he had experienced at Metz.

But to the army of Langle de Cary, unbeaten from the outset of the war in every encounter in which it had been engaged and which, in the position assigned to it in the Battle of the Marne, not only held every foot of ground it was to defend, but actually advanced, even when Foch's right wing was forced back, only grudging criticism is given.

As in so doing, this commander fully protected the gap between his left and Foch's right flank, into which the Germans in their turn were endeavoring to press, it is evident that he must have materially assisted in the stretching of the German line, against which Foch pressed his left flank; and certain it is, that he carried out to the letter the Order of the Day:—

“The time has come to advance at all costs, and to die where you stand, rather than give way.”

No matter, however, to whom most credit was due, the result of the desperate fighting all along the line was, that first von Kluk and then von Bulow and finally the entire German line fell back and the great offensive which was to completely crush France failed with heavy losses in men, material and prestige to the invaders.

At about the same time, Lemberg and Halicz having been captured by the Russians, the retreating Austrian armies in Galicia effected a juncture with their left flank bent back to the junction of the rivers San and Vistula on the northern border of Galicia, their centre at Rawa Ruska and their right on the fortress Grodek, and with both flanks pressed back beyond Przmysl into which some three or more of their army corps found shelter, with heavy losses in men, material and organization, indeed almost routed, yielded to the foe almost the half of Galicia.

If, therefore, the Germans might claim that at the Aisne they had stopped the retreat from the Marne and checked the French pursuit and still held some eight thousand square miles of the most valuable part of France, together with two-thirds of Belgium; yet, as the Russians had seized two-thirds of Galicia; the punitive expedition into Serbia had been beaten back and the English fleet had been sinking German cruisers almost under the guns of Heligoland without loss; in spite of Hindenberg's successes in East Prussia, the war was not progressing satisfactorily for the Germans. Nevertheless, Hindenberg was reorganizing the Austrian armies and, with two new German armies to strengthen them, was aiming at the invasion of Poland and the capture of Warsaw.

## CHAPTER III.

### THE SAVING POWER OF TOLERANCE

Although with the opening of October, 1914, it became apparent that the Allied French and British army had failed to force the Aisne and on the Eastern front the Russians had been forced to give way to a certain extent, yet the situation had vastly improved as compared with the beginning of the previous month. The wonderful campaign of August, in spite of the terrible reverses to the Austrians, which had given to Germany such a belt of French and Belgian territory, at a cost of less than 10,000 German casualties, according to their account, had been succeeded by the German defeat at the Marne, with losses of something like 125,000 men. Some of the German colonies had been occupied and the Japanese were besieging Tsingtau. On the Western European front the French had pushed again into Alsace on their extreme right; while, with continual prolongations, they sought to turn the German right flank. On the left of General Maunoury's army a new army extended in a northwestward direction under the command of Castelnau, and beyond that again another under Maud'huy, whose rise had even been more rapid than that of Foch, Maunoury or Sarraill. Northwest of Maud'huy, General French was aiming to concentrate all his forces, now increased to almost double what he had originally under his command. Practically acknowledging the defeat of their original plan, by the supersession of General von Moltke with General Falkenhayne, the German staff attempted a new objective, the channel ports, Calais and Dunkirk; but these could not be proceeded against until Antwerp had been captured and the Belgian army in their rear disposed of. For reasons probably as distinctly political as military, Prince Ruprecht of Bavaria was entrusted with the task; but before it got under way one further attempt was made to capture Verdun, and, assisted by General Stranz, the Crown Prince of Germany at the head of some 300,000 men,



assaulted the fortress held by General Sarrail, who had run the heavy guns out beyond their original position in improvised earthworks. All efforts failed, and with only the occupation of St. Mihiel, as the point of a deep salient into the French line, the attack was abandoned.

For the Allies, while the French line was moving up from Noyon, it was of the utmost importance to hold Antwerp, against which the Germans were moving, but, as they drew nearer to Antwerp, the apprehensions of the Belgians grew apace.

At the request of his colleagues in the British Cabinet and, with some 6,000 or 7,000 naval men organized by his own energy, Winston Churchill, thoroughly alive to the value of the psychological, sought to stiffen the Belgian defense, if for only a few days.

An equal number of French of the same material were added to the British, and an English army corps landed at Ostend.

The project had not only the support, but the unreserved approval of the army chiefs. It unquestionably held inactive two German army corps, which could have been otherwise used to attack the channel ports, before the French line, moving up from Noyon, could have reached the sea and barred the way. In those few days the French and English line crept up, the retreating Belgians, then covered by the British corps, linked up with the Allied armies on their right and the British war craft on their left, and the line to the channel ports was closed to the Germans; but the fall of Antwerp was such a disagreeable surprise to the British press, and the torpedoing of three old cruisers, at about the same time, so irritating, that a scapegoat had to be found, and, as Churchill's manners also had not been as pleasing as they should have been to one or two great war correspondents, well accustomed to write up or down the great men they met, upon the man by whose foresight and boldness the German fleet had been bottled at Kiel a torrent of criticism was poured.

He was berated as an amateur meddling with what did not concern him. It was remembered that the First Sea Lord under him, whose nephew, as a British soldier, had

sealed his devotion to his country with his death in battle, and whose two sons were serving with the fleet, nevertheless, had an Austrian name, and a campaign was started by the press against an official the whole navy supported as an excellent officer. Churchill's loyal support of his subordinate only added him to the list of those against whom the (Northcliffe) press was beginning to agitate with damnable iteration. The list, by indirection, included General Joffre and directly Lord Haldane, and was soon to include the great Kitchener.

While all this was transpiring the Germans, under Hindenberg, launched their first campaign against Warsaw. For this purpose Hindenberg had two German armies and three Austrian ones. Two of the former Austrians—Auffenberg and Booverig—had been relieved of command, and as in those beleagured, slain and captured, the Austrian armies had been reduced to the amount of some 300,000 or more lost, the remaining armies, three in number, under General Dankl, Boehm von Ermolli, and the Archduke, probably numbered something like 700,000 or 800,000 men.

While General Dimmitrieff, a Bulgar, who had achieved some reputation in the war between the Balkan peoples and Turkey, was given General Russky's former command, to the latter was entrusted the defense of Poland and Courland, into which latter province General Rennenkamp had been driven from East Prussia.

Hindenberg, in this campaign, advanced almost up to Warsaw; but from there was forced to fall back, and the Austrians, being left rather in the lurch, the army of General Dankl suffered severely.

In these battles General Russky out-generalled the great Hindenberg, and, as the result of this offensive, East Prussia was again invaded on the extreme eastern frontier, the centre of the Russian army advancing almost to the German boundary of Silesia and Posen, while, along the Carpathians almost to Cracow, Galicia was occupied by the Grand Duke Nicholas.

In the same month the British army, increased to 180,000, the Belgian army numbering 45,000, and two French armies, under Maud'huy and d'Urbal, bloodily repulsed the German

attacks around Ypres. The fighting there was probably the fiercest which had up to this time occurred in the war, and, while the losses of the Allies reached, in the two months of October and November, 130,000, in the month of October alone the German casualties were by them reported at 279,000, of which more than two-thirds were here inflicted, again under the eye of the German Emperor.

But, although east and west the German invasion had again failed, two events happened at this time calculated to greatly hearten the Germans. The first, by long odds the most spectacular, was valued beyond its worth, valuable as it was to them. The second was for a short while actually deemed what would prove in the long run an injury to the German cause, which, however, German thoroughness and ability utilized enormously.

The British admiralty had secured some successes. The Emden, under her gallant commander, Muller, had been overhauled, outclassed and sunk by the Australian cruiser Sydney. The Konigsberg, shut up in an African river by colliers sunk at the mouth and a squadron under Admiral Craddock, was hunting for the remainder of the Germans. The strength of this squadron was rather carelessly disclosed by the press. It consisted of what in previous naval battles would have been accounted formidable vessels—the Good Hope, armored cruiser, 14,100 tons, mounting two 9.2-inch guns and sixteen 6-inch guns; the Monmouth, armored cruiser, 9,800 tons, mounting fourteen 6-inch guns, and the Glasgow, a much newer but smaller cruiser, of 4,800 tons, at least two knots swifter, but carrying only two 6-inch and ten 4-inch guns.

Off the coast of Chili this squadron, accompanied by a transport, encountered the squadron of Graf von Spee, consisting of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, sister ships, of 11,420 tons each, whose batteries totalled sixteen 8.2-inch and twelve 5.9-inch guns; the Nurnberg and Dresden of 3,544 tons each, adding twelve guns of 4.1-inch to the heavier guns above enumerated. In tonnage there was not much more than the difference of a thousand tons, the British squadron aggregating 28,700, the German, 29,770; but, in

weight of metal discharged from a broadside, the latter had an advantage, and they were newer vessels.

Either from over-confidence or sterling appreciation of the fact that, situated as they were, damage to the German ships was more important than serious damage to his own, rather than avoid, Craddock engaged under additional disadvantages, himself on the skyline about an hour or so before dusk. The action was fought during a storm and ended in the darkness. The two largest vessels of the British squadron were sunk, the other escaped. The German vessels received very little injury. To the world at large the sinking of these two large vessels in those lonely waters at night, while a storm was raging, was an awe-inspiring event; but all Germany rang with exultation over this, the greatest defeat the British navy had experienced in a century.

Synchronizing, as it did, with the entrance of Turkey in the war upon the side of Germany, it may have had something to do with it. But whether so or not, Germany, as subsequent events indicated, could well afford the 414,000 casualties among her best troops, to obtain the 600,000 or 700,000 Turkish troops her leadership and training would make efficient; and so, in the early part of November, two offensives were started. Falkenhayne, with all the masses he could command in the West, driving furiously for the channel ports; while at the same time, with two new generals, Mackensenn and Below, and a new army, Hindenberg stirred up the Austrians for an attack upon Poland.

From November 1st to November 12th, with continued desperate assaults, the Germans hurled themselves against the French and British lines which protected Ypres. The position of the Belgians had been made secure by the flooding of the position in their front and upon the next sector the full fury of the assault was pressed; and there, in the opinion of high French authorities, nothing was more conspicuously demonstrated than the value of Lord Haldane's Territorial Army, there withstanding the finest troops which Germany could bring against them, and measuring fully up to the best regulars in the French or English line.

While the thunder of this conflict in the West was still reverberating, Hindenberg pushed into Poland and, at the

outset, with a force under Below at Kutnow, won a considerable victory, for which Hindenberg was made a Field Marshal. It was followed by a daring thrust on the part of Mackensenn, which almost succeeded, but which Russky foiled, thereby necessitating every effort upon the part of Mackensenn to extricate two of his army corps, which the Russians almost succeeded in surrounding, but which finally cut their way out with heavy loss.

In German East Africa and the Cameroons, meanwhile, the German forces were holding their own, and had it not been for the statemanship of Kitchener, a disaster might have occurred in South Africa. There, as well as in India and Ireland, the Germans had counted confidently on disaffection; but, with that trust in others and breadth of thought which is the accompaniment of all true statemanship, Kitchener had delivered over entirely to the greatest soldier he had ever faced in arms, the conduct of the defense of South Africa. Constitutional government granted the Boers and Home Rule secured thereby, had clinched the loyalty of Botha and the great majority of those, who hardly ten years previous, had stood out in arms, and they undertook the full responsibility for affairs. As Botha stated, in assuming the burden of affairs, German South Africa could have been invaded by Indian forces, Colonial forces or the British in South Africa; but the Imperial Government had asked the Union to do the work, and he declared he was proud to have been asked. With fearless firmness and candor, he uncovered the treacherous neutrality of the Hertzog faction, showing that there was open but one of two courses, either loyalty and help or disloyalty and treason. Tolerance and trust extended in the past had its effect. The mass of the Boers rallied to his side, despite the arguments of such prominent South Africans as ex-President Steyne, DeWet and Hertzog, of the Orange State, and Beyers of Transvaal.

Botha's position, however, was extremely hazardous, for if there were but few whites in German South Africa, there were some and numerous well trained black troops, and an abundance of arms and munitions. In an endeavor to draw the disaffected element into touch with the Germans, Maritz,

a Boer officer, deserted, and, joining the Germans, led an invasion of Cape Colony. That was the signal. Under DeWet and Beyers the revolt broke out at home. In vain Botha appealed to Steyne and Hertzog. They stood apart, by their silence tacitly encouraging the rebels. With that far look ahead into the future, which the great alone can explore, Botha refused the aid of any of the British residents, and, arming Boer against Boer, at the first attack of his opponents, refusing all proffers of parley, called upon them for an unconditional surrender. Then, falling upon Beyers with inconceivable celerity, he overwhelmed his force, Beyers himself being drowned, as in his flight he crossed a river. Then the great South African turned upon that one of his former associates, who, in the eyes of almost all of the English, save Conan Doyle, and numbers of the Dutch, was esteemed a greater warrior than himself, and DeWet, following the tactics upon which his fame had been erected, swiftly fled.

Had he been allowed to move at any great length through the country, there is no telling what might have been the effect, for it was hardly more than a decade since, to the admiration of the world, he had circled South Africa, heartening his followers with his ubiquity and the fierce blows he struck, as he flashed from point to point. He was a great partisan leader, perhaps the greatest who has ever fought, and his flight was no indication that the cause he sustained was lost, for the longer the struggle could be maintained, the greater chance that the neutrals, Hertzog and Steyne would come in. But it was no British general who followed him over the wide veldt. It was a Boer, his superior in all the arts of war and chase in those regions of long distances and scattered habitations, and, with every double, fast on his flying traces came the relentless tracker, who would not be denied. Captured he was, and with his capture the rebellion collapsed. In the dark days just prior to the capture of DeWet, when the fate of South Africa hung in the balance, and with it a great rent in the empire seemed impending, the Tory statesman, Lord Milner, whose policies there had been set aside by the Liberal party of Great Britain in

1906, while now expressing admiration for the tolerance of the empire, asked in a public speech :

"Whether a system so loosely tolerant as the British Imperial system could stand an enormous strain; whether the advantages which we gained from tolerance, from our easy-goingness were sufficient to compensate for the weakness which arose from our very imperfect organization, from the fact that our empire was as loosely knit as it was?"

Botha and his men had answered it, and, in the message he now sent to Great Britain, he indicated what a wise and understanding heart he possessed. He said :

"I am sure my English friends will understand what is expedient when I tell them that continued denunciation of the rebels may wound just those whom I know Englishmen have no desire to wound. I mean the Dutch, who have been responsible for quelling this rebellion. The Loyalists have discharged a painful duty out of a stern sense of honor, and having relatives and friends often among the rebels, they regard the whole rebellion as a lamentable business upon which the curtain should be rung down with as little declamation, as little controversy and as little recrimination as possible. To those who call for the infliction of severe penalties upon the ringleaders I wish to say: Be sure justice will be done. In due time courts will be constituted to deal with these men. For myself, personally, the last three months have provided the saddest experience of all my life. I can say the same for General Smuts, and, indeed, for every member of the government. The late war, our South African war, is but a thing of yesterday. You will understand my feelings and the feelings of the loyal commandos, when among the rebel dead we found, from time to time, men who had fought in our ranks during the dark days of that campaign. The loyal commandos have had a hard task to perform and they have performed it. The cause of law and order has been and will be vindicated. Let that be enough. This is no time for exultation or for recrimination. Let us spare one another's feelings. Remember we have to live together in this land long after the war is ended."

With this so well said, he turned to the task of conquering German South Africa.

Meanwhile, in England, to meet the difficulties engendered by Turkey's entrance in the war upon the side of the Central

powers, and the threat of an attack upon Egypt and the consequent cutting of England's communication with the Dominions and with India, Winston Churchill, head of the British Admiralty, proposed an attack upon the Dardanelles, a forcing of the straits and a seizure of Constantinople.

It was the suggestion of a genius.

For the land portion of a combined force, the British Military Director at the War Office thought that there should be at least 60,000 men; but, in the opinion of the admiralty officials, the mere appearance of the British fleet at the straits, where they believed the forts were short of ammunition, would be the signal for a revolution in Constantinople.

Lord Kitchener thought a greater number than 40,000 troops would be required, and an immense effort was even then being made to send every available man to France. But the British minister telegraphed that the Prime Minister of Greece had proposed to offer the co-operation of a Greek army corps of three divisions and that the King favored it. Whether he did or not, and whether the difference was entirely in the route they should take in getting to Constantinople, there was some evidence later to indicate that Russia did not look with too friendly an eye on any Greek force approaching what she regarded as her especial prize, and a strategic conception of the very greatest value to the Allies was unimproved, when it almost certainly would have been successful.

The Antwerp expedition, which the press could not understand, and Craddock's overwhelming defeat, which the press had helped to bring about, had obscured appreciation of the daring which had bottled the entire German fleet, with the exception of von Spee's squadron, and that even then a powerful British squadron of something like 76,000 tonnage, and mounting twelve 12-inch guns, against von Spee's sixteen 8.2-inch guns, was searching for the latter, was happily unknown to the press and public, and Sturdee was thus enabled to bring the smaller German squadron to battle.

Early in December, like a clap from a clear sky, came the announcement that off the Falkland Islands the British



admiral had caught the squadron of von Spee and, sinking four, was in pursuit of the fifth, a result for which, if the insistent critics of the admiralty had only had sufficient temper to analyze it, Craddock's defeat had been a very great contributing cause, in inducing the Germans to keep together.

But those who had criticised Churchill for Craddock's defeat, were loath to give him credit for this, the most complete and effective blow struck so far during the struggle, with the exception of the epoch-making Battle of the Marne, and so the daring stroke for the seizure of the straits of the Dardanelles was still delayed.

An expedition from India, however, had landed at the head of the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal was being put in a state of defense.

Germany had failed to crush France, but she had seized and was holding nine-tenths of Belgium and about 8,000 square miles of the most important part of France, with regard to which, the munition supply of that country was added, instead of to France, to the great store of her enemy.

Yet, if France was weakened thereby, such loss was more than counterbalanced by the steady increase in the power of the British Empire, freed by the victory of Sir Frederick Sturdee from further prey upon her far-extended lines of communication and expanding, under the amazing volunteer movement, to proportions beyond the conceptions of the world.

If anything was wanted to help this wonderful patriotic movement, the idiotic Zeppelin warfare upon the cities of England kept it continually warm, and, with a loss at the end of 1914 of 850,000 in casualties, the German staff now turned its attention to that strategy which had been discussed in "*Germania Triumphans*" twelve years earlier, viz.: everything that Germany, Austria and Turkey could do to be brought to bear upon Russia.

Russia, if she had not accomplished all that had been expected of her, and had made the task of the French and British unnecessarily hard with regard to the Balkans, yet had done most of the heavy work, and, with her great armies

intact and on the edge of Germany, holding almost all of Galicia, she now called for action at the Dardanelles.

By both the Allied and the Central powers a diplomatic play was made for the accession of Bulgaria and Greece, and, if as claimed, 40,000 men furnished by France and Great Britain would not have brought in Greece, it would seem as if it would have been good judgment to have furnished the number demanded, unless it was absolutely beyond the power of those two governments to furnish such. But, apparently, Great Britain and France would not consent to come to such conditions as Greece demanded to secure from her her treaty obligations to Serbia, and, meanwhile, Germany was lending money to Bulgaria, a condition of affairs which indicated a closer accord than was safe for Serbia without help.

What Great Britain and France could furnish to Greece in the way of troops, to sustain her entrance being put at 40,000 men, was by the Greek staff deemed inadequate, and, if by lending to Bulgaria Germany had interrupted negotiations with Greece, which might have brought Bulgaria in on the side of the Entente, Germany had accomplished a great deal.

By inducing Austria to suspend her efforts against Serbia and bend all her energies against Russia, Germany also not only secured a necessary force to assist her in her attack, but, by puffing up the Serbians, made them less amenable to the suggestions of the French and British. The consequence was that while preparations went on for the Russian drive, the effort to get the Balkan peoples together failed, or, at least, halted.

The question then arose: could the fleet alone force the Dardanelles? That was the question at the beginning of the year.

It is all very well for a commission to state now that it would have been better to have used a land and sea force; but, if the land force was not available and a sea force was, it became an immense question as to the effect of a refusal to try it, in the face of a request from so important a member of the Allied forces as Russia was at that time. Refusal

to try might have brought Russia to a stop, and that, happening in January, 1915, would have meant the victory of Germany. All these conditions have to be carefully weighed by any fair-minded investigator of the Dardanelles campaign.

For fully five weeks Russia had been maintaining the brunt of the efforts of Germany, Austria and Turkey. The French effort, which had been enormous for three months and a half, had been, of necessity, slackened under the drain in men and material it had occasioned. The British had barely been able to make good their casualties, and both French and British felt it imperative to prepare for an offensive in the spring, to drive the Germans out of France and Belgium. The suggestion of an early attack on the Dardanelles was, therefore, one which presented to the minds of the French and British governments many difficulties. But no difficulty was as great as that which might arise from a disappointed Russia. The idea of the French general, Joffre, and very probably also General Kitchener, was that if the German loss, which had reached 850,000 in the first five months of the war, could be kept at 150,000 a month for a year, or, at most, a couple of years, Germany would be obliged to sue for peace. It was the policy of attrition. If Russia ceased her efforts it was at an end before Britain's strength could be attained.

## CHAPTER IV.

### THE RECOURSE TO "GERMANIA TRIUMPHANS"

With the opening of the year 1915, Russia, pressed by German, Austrian and Turkish armies, requested action at the Dardanelles. The British Secretary of War declared no troops were yet available for such an operation, and when it is recollected that of the forces sent to France from Mons to the Marne, and thence to the Aisne and Ypres, in repelling the assaults of the German hosts, something like 25 per cent. of the British had been killed, wounded and captured; that every one of the 180,000 men in line between the German armies and Calais was needed, and more; that, in addition, the invasion of the Cameroons had to be pressed and East Africa defended and that Egypt, a point of vital interest in the communications of the empire, was threatened, not only by Turkey, but by all the Mahommedan powers of Africa, in spite of the fact that from every walk in life in unprecedented numbers, Englishmen, Scotchmen, Irishmen and Colonials were volunteering for service, it was difficult to see from where the necessary land force for the Dardanelles could be obtained.

Yet it was a supreme question. Could Russia be denied the effort? Upon Russia, at this stage, almost every hope of the Allies depended. Growing by great and steady accessions, the vast forces of the British Empire were taking shape and would, in time, become of enormous effect, but time was essential to their full development. Upon Russia every effort of the Central powers was now concentrated. Twice had the Russian armies under Russky driven back the redoubted conqueror of Tannenberg, and the Grand Duke, at the same time, had crowded the Austrian armies back to the Carpathians.

Now, extended in a long line from the North Sea on the outskirts of Prussia, and occupying almost the whole of Galicia from Cracow to Bukowina, the Russians had, in small detachments, penetrated into the plains of Hungary,

where, if they could once pour in mass and effect a juncture with the Serbian armies to the West, the war would be moving to a swift conclusion.

But to effect this, an arrangement with Roumania was, at this stage, of the most extreme importance, and this Russian and Roumanian political considerations rendered difficult. Almost any concession that could have been made to Roumania should have been granted, as without such both flanks of the Russian grand army had to be protected, and the invasion of Hungary only carried out across the Carpathians with the most costly frontal attacks. In addition, in the Caucasus, Russia had now to meet the invasion of five Turkish corps, or something like 200,000 men, in shattering two of which, among the mountain snows her own forces suffered; and so, beset on every side, she called upon her allies for something in the way of a diversion to relieve the strain to which she was subjected, and to enable her to push with all her strength against the crumbling forces of Austria.

If there was not available British or French troops, there was available the mighty forces of the great British navy, its officers chafing for some opportunity to exert the enormous power of which they felt themselves capable and denied, by the prudent course of the German naval authorities, keeping the German fleet in harbor, except for an occasional dash out to harry the coast of Britain and scuttle back to port before the British ships could catch them.

And just at this time, to add to the impression of Sir Frederick Doveton Sturdee's destruction of Graf von Spee's squadron, an even more powerful British squadron in the North Sea, under Sir David Beatty, consisting of five of the greatest battle cruisers afloat, three of which were from 26,000 to 28,000 tons, and two of 17,000 tons, overhauled in the North Sea four great German cruisers, three of which were about on a par with the heaviest of the British, and the other about 2,000 tons lighter than the two inferior British vessels.

While in tonnage, 90,240, to the British 115,200, and mounting but eight 12-inch and twenty 11-inch guns, to the twenty-four 13.5-inch and sixteen 12-inch guns, which con-

stituted the heavy ordnance of their enemies, the Germans, in their secondary batteries, disposed of twelve 8.2-inch and forty-four 5.9-inch guns, against the British twelve 6-inch and thirty-two 4-inch guns, and, in a sturdy stand-up fight, would not have had great odds against them; but, in the headlong flight, in which they sped back to harbor, the *Blucher*, of 15,000 tons, was sunk and two of the finest cruisers of the German navy set on fire and damaged, ere the three remaining escaped.

The encounter, therefore, increased the confidence of the British in their navy, drove the Germans to the plan of the submarine warfare only, and the British to the attack upon the Dardanelles, unsupported by any land force.

While the Allies, with a formidable fleet of older vessels with very heavy guns were bombarding the forts at the entrance of the strait, the Germans, under Hindenberg, were attacking both flanks of the great Russian army in Courland and Bukowina. They drove Rennenkamp out of East Prussia, but were unsuccessful in their attempt at Prasnyz, northwest of Warsaw, where the losses were heavy. But Rennenkamp's defeat had forced Russky to send him reinforcements, and when the Austrians, under General Pflanzer, occupied Bukowina, and advancing further, captured Stanislau, in Galicia, the Grand Duke Nicholas was also obliged to reinforce his left wing. This drew strength away from the point of attack in the Carpathians, and the *London Times* had to admit that the Germans had achieved some successes, yet, in the opinion of Lord Northcliffe's greatest paper, the German strategy appeared "to be resolving itself into a succession of violent expensive and unproductive blows, delivered alternately on each front," with regard to which it expressed the opinion:

"If the German headquarter staff can derive any sincere satisfaction from their more recent attempt to hack through the Russian lines, we fail to discern the cause of their thankfulness."

Concerning the Dardanelles, the same paper declared the news "extremely favorable," and after reciting the entrance

of the fleet into the straits and progress therein for four miles, continued as follows:

"We have every reason to hope and believe that the task of forcing the Dardanelles, which the Allied fleets have so admirably begun, will be carried through successfully. . . . The moment a way is forced through the Dardanelles from end to end, Constantinople will lie at the mercy of the guns of the Allied fleets. . . . It cannot be too often emphasized that the present attack on the Dardanelles is an operation which, if completed, must have enormous influence upon every portion of the theatre of war. Russia needs closer communications with the open sea, and she will get them. The Balkan kingdoms, who have been fed too long upon German lies, will know where they stand when they hear the sound of the Allied guns. The other results which must follow the clearing of the Dardanelles and the inevitable collapse of the Turks are immeasurable. THE ATTACK IS AN EXAMPLE OF FAR SEEING VISION OF A KIND WHICH THE ALLIES HAVE HITHERTO TOO OFTEN LACKED."

Could endorsement of Churchill's view have gone further? But that was not all.

General Sir Arthur Paget, on a special mission to the Balkans, sent a telegram to Earl Kitchener, at about the same time, that the operations at the Dardanelles had made so deep an impression, that all chances of Bulgaria intervening against the Entente was gone.

The Germans, too, realized the terrible significance of this drive for Constantinople and, while preparing to crush Russia, with magnificent energy, drew attention to France and Belgium. Near Soissons, in a fierce assault, they drove Maunoury's army across the Aisne with serious losses of men and guns, and what might have been a disaster was only saved by the prompt action of a Colonel Nivelle, later to rise to high station. In their attack upon the English at La Bassee, they failed to budge the stubborn islanders, almost invincible upon the defense, but they achieved their real purpose, for, rising to the fly cast, the British losing sight of the grand and incalculable possibilities at the Dardanelles, and encouraged by the ignorant and opinionated press, fancied the opportunity had come to drive the Germans out of Belgium, and, with a loss of 12,000, won the

battle of Neuve Chappelle, which cost the Germans a few square miles and casualties as great or possibly greater. In Champagne also General d'Esperey inflicted a loss upon the Germans of some 15,000. But the results of these two efforts were trifling as compared to the possibilities at the Dardanelles, in giving the Allies closer communications with the Russian front, where the Grand Duke's army had forced the Duklow, Luchow and Rosztoki Passes in the Carpathians and sent his Cossacks galloping into the plains of Hungary, while something like 80,000 prisoners had fallen into his hands.

Russia indeed seemed on the eve of a colossal success. On the 21st of March the great Austrian fortress of Przmysl fell, and with it 130,000 Austrian prisoners and great quantities of material and munitions.

It was a dark hour for Germany, but her great captains did not quail, rather they bent themselves the more sternly to the task of striking down their greatest adversary while alone and out of touch with her Allies; for in such case the blow would be all the more crippling.

On the other hand, with the first serious reverse to the war vessels in the straits, a change came over the attack, and no one but Churchill had any more heart for a strong offensive. A halting, desultory bombardment proceeded, while a land force was prepared and two months after the fleet had opened the attack, the land force, some 80,000 to 100,000 in number, at three points, forced a landing at terrific loss, if with magnificent gallantry. The French force at Kum Kale, which protected the right flank of the British force at Cape Hellas, withdrew, for some reason, and its commander, General d'Amade, was superseded in his command, but the British and Colonials clung firmly to the bloody strips of land they had won.

Again, to distract attention from the point of all points, where danger lay to their great plans, the Germans opened an attack upon the French line in Belgium with a gas cloud, which drove them back and, had it not been for the devoted courage of the Canadians in the British army at this point, might have given to the Germans the last bit of Belgium. But this the heroic behavior of the Canadians prevented, and



the British commander, being thus enabled to reinforce his line, reformed it, and the French, recovering, regained some of the ground they had lost.

Still, at Gallipoli everything for some ten days or two weeks was at a standstill, and by that time the German plans, having been perfected, Mackensenn began the great battle of the Dunajec.

Under a storm of shells he burst through the Russian lines, and the invasion of Hungary was at an end.

Three days later Sir Ian Hamilton attempted to push up the Gallipoli peninsular, but apparently was not in sufficient force or lacked that which Mackensenn had had in abundance, heavy ordnance, such being only on the old war vessels there, which had been saved from further risk in the straits.

While the attack upon the Dardanelles, so supremely important for Russia, and, as she weakened, for her Allies, simmered down, Mackensenn, with 30,000 prisoners and 70 guns captured from the Russians, vigorously pushed them back from the Carpathians to the line of the Vistula and the San, and, with these mighty, world-resounding blows being recorded, the military correspondent of the *London Times*, with his microscopic eye firmly fastened upon Neuve Chapelle, declared:

"The want of an unlimited supply of high explosives was a fatal bar to our success."

Undoubtedly, with a greater supply of high explosives at the various points where they were needed in the Allied lines, a greater success might have been achieved, a lesser injury sustained, but the high explosive which was subsequently supplied, in all the quantity needed, did not entirely cure the difficulties that the Allies experienced, and, while the paper was, therefore, deserving of credit in indicating one mode of greatly strengthening the armies, there was no necessity for it to have warred so persistently upon the great English general, to whom, more than any other individual, it was due, that in the last hour of stress and strain, the volunteers of Britain in amazing numbers and devoted cour-

age, were to stand in the breach for the civilization of the world.

Holding up a considerable force of Turks in the Peninsular, where they crept slowly and painfully forward, the British army at Gallipoli made possible the farther advance of the small British and Indian force which had occupied Basra, near the Persian Gulf. Also they rendered the Turkish attack upon the Suez Canal one easily repulsed, but a small British force at Aden was driven in to that city by the Turks.

Instead of exerting every effort at the one point where success could have assisted the Russian armies, still falling back for lack of munitions, with the entrance of Italy in the war, upon the side of the Entente, a coalition government was formed in Great Britain, and Churchill's place in the admiralty was filled by the Conservative leader of former times, Mr. Balfour, who, with the new leader of that party, Mr. Bonar Law, Mr. Long, Mr. Austin Chamberlain and others joined the ministry.

A very great man, but an even greater promiser, the hope of the Conservative party, the Radical, Lloyd George, universally acknowledged to have done a mighty work in the accumulating of munitions and the organizing of industrial effort in the supply of them, now gave out the key to success, munitions and still more munitions, with which to "blast a way to victory."

In the midst of the confusion and change came the simple announcement that Botha had conquered German South Africa.

So quietly and expeditiously had he disposed his forces, that the matter was entirely completed before the press had had a fair opportunity to advise him how it should be done.

Through the early summer, while Lemburg, Lublin and Warsaw fell into the hands of the Germans, the Allied force pushed up a bit on the Gallipoli Peninsular, but could not surmount the height of AchiBaba, which dominated the tip, or the high ridge which barred the Australians higher up on the other edge. Finally, in August, a fresh force of some 50,000 or more troops were dispatched to the Dardanelles.

In the opinion of the general in command, the force was just about half or a third of what reinforcements were needed. It apparently was most unfortunately commanded, and, in the execution of the well planned attack, incompetently led, but why the general in supreme command did not himself undertake this supremely important task, when he realized the incompetence of his subordinate, has not been shown.

After attracting to itself the attention of the world and in some publications being proclaimed, in advance, a great success, the attack ended in failure and, abandoning further effort there, attention now was turned upon the offensive in France where, amply supplied with high explosives, and addressing themselves entirely to "the main," in place of "the subsidiary campaign," it was ardently hoped and believed, the Allies would "blast a way to victory."

Indeed, something had to be attempted, for Russia was staggering under the succession of blows which had been showered upon her since the month of May, and her losses in men, material and territory were stupendous. Not only all of Poland, but the greater part of Courland, Vilna, Kovno, Grodno, Minsk and Volhynia, a spread of land greater than one-half of France, had passed into the hands of the conquering Germans, who were almost in gunshot of the great city of Riga, which it was expected they would seize in a week or ten days, while in the South, by Christmas, it was anticipated the Austrians would reach Odessa, on the Black Sea. In prisoners alone, it was asserted, the Russian armies had yielded up a million men.

The force with which the French and British sought to open the offensive of September, 1915, has been variously estimated from 250,000 British and 900,000 French, to a little more than one-third that figure for the French.

Under Generals Gough, Rawlinson, Castelnau and d'Urbal, the assault was made and was sufficiently successful to cause the Germans to suspend their efforts against Russia and bend all energies to resisting the attack. More than 27,000 German prisoners were captured and a loss inflicted upon the Germans in killed and wounded of at least 100,000. Many heavy guns and field pieces, machine guns and muni-

tions also fell into the hands of the Allies, and at first their losses were slight, but both British and French troops advanced beyond what the staff had anticipated; the losses of both were extremely heavy, the gain in territory trifling, and the British commander-in-chief raised to a peerage and removed to another field of service was relieved of the supremely important station he had held for a year and a month.

At a cost in casualties amounting, by their published lists, to 2,148,979, with a loss of only a hundred or more square miles in Alsace, and their grasp on some 15,000 square miles upon the richest part of France and Belgium unshaken, in addition to a realm in Russia, Germany was now ready to move against Serbia and strike terror into all the Balkan peoples.

Under Mackensenn, a force of Austro-Germans moved against the Serbian front, while the Bulgarians prepared to drive in from the East. All efforts to compose the political differences of the Balkan peoples in harmony with the purposes and exigencies of the Entente powers had failed. Even the offer of Cyprus to Greece, a most proper proposal, but received with indignation by an element in England, incapable of understanding the gravity of the situation, or of ever yielding anything, they had set their jaws upon, was not sufficient to induce the Greeks to stand to their treaty obligations with Serbia, from and out of which Bulgarian animosity had arisen; while their refusal to yield Kavala, later permitted by them to be stolen by the same power, made the concessions of Serbia unavailing.

At the invitation of Venizelos, the Greek Prime Minister, it is true an Allied force landed at Saloniki, but almost immediately a perfunctory protest against the landing was made, while the officials at the same time expedited it. At the Dardanelles, however, inactive and stale, the French and British forces merely held up, as inactive, a large Turkish force and probably assisted the British general, Townshend, in Mesopotamia, with a mixed Anglo-Indian force, to drive the Turks out of Kut El Amara on the Tigris.

Both Britain and Russia acknowledged the defeat of their campaigns for the year in the removal of the Grand Duke Nicholas from the command of all the armies of Russia and his dispatch to the comparatively small field of the Caucasus, and by the discussion in the British parliament concerning the removal of the British troops from the Dardanelles, which, while still delayed, brought about the resignation of Winston Churchill of the unimportant office he had held since his resignation of the admiralty.

Why there had been such persistent enmity and criticism of the most efficient head the British navy has had, so far in the war, was and is an interesting question. Judged absolutely by published utterances of his harshest critics, he possessed some rare qualities for his high station. Without the slightest taint of questionable pecuniary gain from his official position, never accused of nepotism, throughout an administration of the navy, more capable than any which has succeeded it, fiercely, wildly and foolishly denounced for not resorting to extreme measures by those whose clamor for such was completely and instantly stilled by the grim threat of German reprisals, it has been calmly stated by excellent, cultured English gentlemen, as if conclusive of the question, that in "ratting" from the Conservative to the Liberal party in 1905, this grandson of the Duke of Marlborough was such a renegade to what the English Book of Common Prayer designates as "our betters," that he actually "REVEALED THE SECRETS OF HIS CLASS."

Now, as a major in the army, he parted with the government, leaving to them this excellent piece of advice: "Let us look after the war and after the war will look after itself."

It was the darkest day for the Allies. Earl Kitchener visited Gallipoli to decide whether the forces there should be withdrawn; and, realizing that this was only delayed, the Turks hurried forces East and catching General Townshend's small army within twenty miles of Bagdad outnumbered it and drove it back in retreat to Kut El Amara, where, with a third or more of his force, he was at once surrounded.

Deep into Russia and still with their strong grip sucking the strength out of France and Belgium, the long line of

German armies faced their foes far from their own boundaries, save in Alsace.

Broken, shattered and streaming into Albania, after a most heroic resistance, the Serbian army abandoned Serbia to the Bulgarians and Austrians. Back to Saloniki fell the French and British, who had advanced to their support, and, at last, to the great relief of the British public and also, quite possibly, to the Turks and Germans, the entire British and French forces were withdrawn from the Gallipoli peninsular with scarcely a casualty. Admirable as was the efficiency of those conducting this marvelous retreat, it never seems to have crossed the minds of the eulogists of it, that it may have been as satisfactory a performance to the German Staff as to themselves; for it made impossible the forcing of the passage of the Dardanelles, so acutely dangerous to their main plan of World Power.

And now, with their casualties amounting to 2,627,085, the Government at Berlin commenced to throw out arrogant intimations of their willingness to entertain peace proposals from their adversaries.

To blaze the great broad path to Constantinople, over shattered Serbia, had, in the two months with which they had paved it, cost the greater Germany in casualties 375,771 men, more than three times the loss Great Britain had experienced at the Dardanelles and all fronts during the same period, now having enrolled soldiers to the amount of 5,000,000. Germany therefore was in just the position to treat for peace.

Although all their larger vessels had been driven from the seas, through their submarine campaign, against the excesses of which the United States was still patiently protesting, the Germans had inflicted upon the British a loss of about 200,000 tons in war vessels of the older class and a very much heavier loss in merchant shipping. French, Italians and Russians had also suffered from the submarines as well as Austria and Turkey from English submarines. But the German submarines had also sent to bottom, Spanish, Swedish, Danish, Dutch, Norwegian and American neutrals; while they themselves had sustained a loss in war vessels of something like 100,000 tons, by British gunfire,

and from the British blockade the German people were undoubtedly suffering.

It was the time of all times for the Germans to have shown moderation. Situated as they were, they could well have afforded to have brought all the neutrals to their side by such offers as would, at that time, have appeared magnanimous. To Belgium, her ravished territory with an indemnity, to France, hers also, with the offer of a plebiscite in Alsace and Lorraine under certain conditions by which the inhabitants would have been afforded an opportunity to decide their nationality. They could have refrained from insisting upon the return of all their colonies; have induced Austria to yield to Italy the strip that country had seized, and to Russia, Ruthenia, and persuaded Turkey to have left with Great Britain that portion of Mesopotamia occupied below Bagdad; only insisting, that in the restoration of Serbian territory that portion of Macedonia she had agreed should be Bulgarian should remain such, together with the small bit to the extreme East between the Danube and the Timok rivers, and securing for Serbia an outlet on the Adriatic at Durazzo in exchange, and Skutari to Montenegro in exchange for Mt. Loftchen to Austria. To the world sick of war and to the great Republic of America striving for peace, these would have seemed wonderful concessions for the victors; for few would have realized then what a world would have still remained to Germany.

Absolutely dependent upon her genius of organization, her allies, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey, would have been as wax in her hands. Penetrated and exploited by German industry and skill on the outskirts of the enriched and strengthened Turkish dominion, Persia, Egypt, Abyssinia and even the Soudan would have felt the touch of a new and strange power stirring; and, in ten years, the German Empire could have overwhelmed the world in arms, had it not been permitted to dominate it in peace with its ideals.

But with their devouring ambition to emulate the British in empire building, the Germans lacked one singular British trait, continually appearing in the leaders of that most remarkable people, when least expected—"surprise at their own moderation."

For that great blend of the Teuton and the Celt, which had blocked their march into France and in consequence been proclaimed their one foe, the militarists of Germany experienced an intense hate and burned with the desire to bring Great Britain to her knees as a suppliant for peace. Therefore terms of peace the Germans would not state; such must be asked of them, they insisted. Meanwhile that slow-moving, stumbling but persistent and tenacious people, undismayed by zeppelins and submarines, held firmly to the blockade which if slowly and imperfectly, yet to some extent weakened their adversary and gathering together the 5,000,000 of their sons who had freely offered their lives for their country's cause, prepared to array them against the best that Germany could bring into the field.



## CHAPTER V.

### VERDUN AND "DER TAG"

With the opening of the new year in January, 1916, the British Government addressed itself to the work in hand with those ceremonies, in the distribution of honors which for generations have excited the lively interest, the undisguised amusement and the unslaked envy of a great portion of the world. Upon the Czar, whose armies rent and riven had been driven back hundreds of miles within their own boundaries, was conferred the appointment of a British Field Marshal.

With ponderous politeness, the London Times declared it to be—

"a happy compliment, not only to the part which his Imperial Majesty has played in the war, but also to the valor of his armies."

With some assurance, the paper also added, that the honor was "especially gratifying to all the Allied nations."

To Lord Curzon and the Duke of Devonshire were given the Garter, in the opinion of The Times, for "services well earned"; and the appointment of two Labor Members, Mr. Crooks and Mr. Barnes, as Members of the Privy Council was also commended. But, in the elevation of Admiral Sir Charles Beresford to the House of Lords as a Baron; while upon Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick Doveton Sturdee, who, in the annihilation of the entire squadron of Graf von Spee, had won for England the most decisive and valuable victory achieved by an English force on land or sea during the whole progress of the war, was bestowed a Baronetcy, it saw no occasion for comment.

Winter held the main armies in its clutch; but on the outer edges to the Southeast, Sir John Nixon, Commander in Chief of the Mesopotamian expedition, was relieved of his command, which was entrusted to Sir Percy Lake, under whose orders General Aylmer advanced up the river Tigris

to succor the besieged General Townshend. And while at Saloniki the French General Sarrail was placed in supreme command of the French and British forces there, the Austrians moved into Montenegro and seizing Mt. Loftchen, which dominated Cattaro, proceeded to overrun the little country.

In the first month of 1916 little or nothing of importance transpired. The Russians had pushed back into a portion of Galicia and seized about 3,500 square miles of Austrian territory in addition to the strip of about 500 from which they had never been dislodged since the first offensive of 1914; but elsewhere there was no movement of any consequence, save the driving into Spanish Africa of the remnants of the German forces in the Cameroons, which the united efforts of the French and British expeditionary forces accomplished in this month.

In German East Africa, however, not only had no progress been made, but in British East Africa, adjoining, the British under General Smith Dorrien were defending their own frontier from invasion. This general, having a little later been relieved on account of ill health, the Boer General Smuts was asked to take command and accepted. In February the somewhat stagnant condition of affairs was altered by a heavy blow inflicted upon the Turks in the Caucasus region by the Russians. Breaking their center, the army of the Grand Duke Nicholas pursued them to Erzurum, which he carried by assault, inflicting a loss upon the Turks of about 35,000 men killed, wounded and prisoners, and a hundred guns and a considerable amount of munitions of war captured. An energetic pursuit of the defeated Turkish army put almost all of Armenia under Russian control. To the south the British expedition up the Tigris did not seem, however, to make much progress in the attempt to relieve General Townshend and with a great space of country still between the Russian and the British armies, the Turks prevented a juncture, which might have injured seriously the Central Powers.

All these encounters on the outskirts nevertheless paled into insignificance, in the light of the great assault the German Crown Prince now made upon Verdun; for, advised

by General Haseler, and supplied with 400,000 troops, the heir to the Imperial throne of Germany now essayed to storm France's greatest fortress and convince that country of the uselessness of any further continuance of the struggle against such invincible a foe as Germany.

At the time, Verdun was defended by General Herr in command of a section of the right wing of General Langle de Cary, with barely 80,000 men; but as soon as the full magnitude of the attack developed, General Petain was put in command of the defending force, increased to 250,000.

At the opening of the assault, in the first week from February 21st to February 28th, the German advance was ominous; but with arrival of reinforcements and the assumption of the command by Petain, the German assault was checked and thereafter simply furnished a means of exhausting the German army to a greater extent than the French.

As through the weeks and months, attack and counter attack followed one another over the shell torn area, wonder was expressed why the British did not in their turn attack the German lines opposed to them, from Ypres to the Somme. They were quite ready to do so; but there were good reasons why they did not. General Joffre did not wish them to; for while steadily increasing in strength along the eighty miles they held, they as yet numbered but 430,000 troops as opposed to 460,000 Germans on the line and others in reserve, and, while the Irish rebellion was soon crushed, there was an indisposition to denude Ireland and England of all the best trained troops; and so all through March and April the hammering continued at Verdun, concentrating attention on that spot and only distracted briefly by a small event in Mesopotamia, which, nevertheless, aroused great chagrin in England. This was the surrender at Kut El Amara of General Townshend with 3,000 British and 6,000 Indian troops after a siege of 143 days, the expedition under Sir Percy Lake having failed to relieve him. As he had shown distinct ability, he was a loss; and that for a couple of months or more an expeditionary force had been within twenty miles of him and yet unable to get in touch with him

looked like poor generalship upon the parts of Generals Aylmer or Lake.

In contrast upon the arrival of General Smuts, matters in East Africa took on a different complexion and this difficult piece of work was now steadily progressing to a completion. Yet here as everywhere the Germans showed themselves to be masterly organizers. Under their leadership Austrians, Turks and Bulgarians rose to a pitch of efficiency that without such they lacked, and this was the same case with the warlike negroes of East Africa.

The war had now proceeded a sufficiently long time for some estimate of the opposing soldiery to be made and, with the exception of the French, there were as yet no troops quite up to the Germans. To put it as accurately as such a thing could be put at, the French line was perhaps not quite as good; but from the divisional commanders up, it was probably superior. In defense the British were fully up and possibly slightly superior to either French or Germans; but in the offensive the inexperience of their officers became at once marked. But the British were adapting themselves to the necessities of the mammoth war. Slowly it is true, in comparison with the early decisive action of the French military authorities, which had so swiftly raised the commanders of the armies of that nation to the very highest excellence, the British were yet, to some degree, weeding out the incapables from the stations to which social influence and qualities essentially manly if not supremely mental had elevated these. In valor the bulk of these were all that could be desired, and, to contend with and rule inferior races, not lacking the requisites; but hardly capable of contending with such scientific fighters and manoeuvrers as the Germans. Living pretty strictly up to the rule laid down by that admirable specimen of the Briton of former days, Lord Wolsely, that the best way for a young officer to rise to distinction was by trying to get killed, they were in this most materially assisted by their foes, and the loss of officers had been very heavy. But now, on the fighting line in France, a great army was in every respect preparing itself to meet the Germans and fight the issue out.

On the sea, the persistence of President Wilson had at last secured a modification of the submarine warfare, and the retirement from command of Admiral von Tirpitz.

In the month of May, the third month of the determined battle at Verdun, the Austrians also launched an offensive against the Italian front and, at first, carried everything before them in their rush. Conditions looked far from encouraging to the Entente; for the Germans seemed creeping, if slowly, yet nearer and nearer to Verdun, and the fact that declarations were occasionally being made, that its capture after all would not be a matter of much importance sounded ominous, especially as the Austrian movement looked very much like an effort at the same time to get into the south of France across northern Italy. It is true, according to the Allies, the attack upon Verdun had been very costly to the Germans; but, according to the Germans, the French were through it being bled to death. Yet two facts were indisputable, the first, that their approach to it was more and more retarded in the months that past, while their casualties steadily rose at the same time.

From 35,198 in February and 63,545 in March, the German loss rose to 91,162 in April; while, in their peculiarly arranged lists of casualties, although the number of prisoners lost to the enemy never reached 2,000, varying from 1,345 in February, 1,725 in March and 1,221 in April, the "missing" reported in the same months steadily rose from 2,017 in February to 6,217 in April.

It was evidently in connection with the attack upon Verdun, that in May the Austrian army, 300,000 strong, swept down the Trentine upon the Italians and in the first few days carried everything before them, capturing over 23,000 prisoners and driving the Italians out of heights and from passes it had taken them a year to win with continuous fighting. The Austrian force opposed to the Italians upon all fronts had, up to this time, been estimated at about 350,000; but it now rose to at least 600,000 and probably more and, coincidently with the attack, the German assault upon Verdun flamed up with greater fury. Both French and Italians rallied to the defense and the fighting on both fronts became desperate.

In the far East, mindful of the danger threatened by the efforts of the British below Kut El Amara under General Gorringe and the Russians moving west from Persia under General Baratoff, to aid the force of about 200,000 Turks opposing them, a mixed Austro-German division was dispatched to Bagdad and, while, in these far separated quarters of the world, the contending forces of soldiery faced each other, on June 30th occurred the greatest naval battle of the world's history.

In command of a squadron of six battle cruisers and four of the swiftest battleships of Britain, in tonnage aggregating 254,000 tons and mounting thirty-two 15-inch, thirty-two 13.5-inch and sixteen 12-inch guns, accompanied by the usual complement of light cruisers and torpedo craft, Sir David Beatty sighted the battle cruiser squadron of von Hipper, five in number, of a tonnage amounting to 131,280 and mounting forty 12-inch guns, also attended by light cruisers and torpedo craft.

Off the northwestern coast of Denmark at 3:48 p. m. the squadrons engaged, as the Germans turned southeast, steering for a junction with their battle fleet. The advantage in force was with the British; but, in the half hour which ensued before they reached the main fleet, the Germans succeeded in inflicting upon their pursuers a heavy loss in the sinking of the *Queen Mary* and *Indefatigable*, thus wiping out of existence sixteen of the eighty heavy guns opposed to their forty and in half an hour obliterating two ships aggregating a tonnage of 45,750 tons with their complement of 1,790 seamen. As the German squadron had the speed and could have escaped this was a daring and splendid achievement and, as long as the valiant esteem skill and valor, will redound to the honor of von Hipper and his men.

In their authorized account, the English highly extoll Sir David Beatty for his decision, subsequent to such a loss, when von Hipper had succeeded in leading him into contact with the main German battle fleet, to attempt, with regard to the entire German fleet, what von Hipper had done to his squadron, that is, by battling with it on the way, to lead it to the main British fleet.

It might have been taken for granted, that the daring British admiral never for one instant contemplated any other course; for hesitation with regard to such would not only have marked him as far below his gallant adversary, but, also, as hardly fit to hold the high and important command entrusted to him. In spite of his loss, like a veritable British bulldog, Beatty hung upon the German fleet, much stronger in proportion to his powerful squadron than even that had been with regard to von Hipper's, and, for an additional hour and a half, the battle proceeded, the two fleets having come about and now bearing northeast instead of southeast, in which period of time, without experiencing any further very heavy loss, the British succeeded in destroying one of the finest German battle cruisers, probably the Lutzow, later admitted to have been lost in the encounter; but in about two hours from the opening of the battle, the German admiral von Scheer realized that he was doing but little additional injury to his enemy, while being drawn into contact with the main British fleet, and, coming about, steered south again. Even if Beatty had not handled his squadron any better than von Hipper had manoeuvred his, yet he had handled it extremely well; for, if he had sustained a loss of two great ships and possibly 2,000 men, yet he had destroyed an enemy cruiser greater than any in his squadron and led the entire German fleet up to the British main fleet, whose part it was now to destroy it. But Jellicoe and the admirals under him did not display ability in proportion to the power they wielded.

The third battle cruiser squadron under Admiral Hood was leading the main battle fleet and, while it is reported that he observed flashes of gunfire to the southwest at 5:30 p. m., and sent a swift light cruiser to investigate, which in fifteen minutes became engaged, yet he apparently held still so far east, that upon her return and report, he was obliged to put his helm northwest to reach Beatty, in compliance with whose order, to take position at the head of the British line, he at once did so, and, with his fine vessel carrying six 12-inch guns and 780 men, was promptly sunk. The explanation of this immediate loss being that, as he attempted to engage at 8,000 yards, while at no time did Beatty ever get

nearer than 12,000, and, for the most part, fought at from 14,000 to 18,000 yards, Hood, in coming about, probably did that which Schley at Santiago had had the military intelligence to avoid. Hood sank his vessel and lost his entire crew "in a most inspiring manner, worthy of his great naval ancestors;" Schley lost one man, inflicted great damage on his adversary, and went to his grave the recipient of carping criticism. The one looped in, the other looped out, a pure question of naval tactics.

But Admiral Arbuthnot displayed even less tactical ability than Hood, for he succeeded in getting his, the first cruiser squadron, between the German and the British battle fleets, which cost the British the Defence and Black Prince sunk, and the Warrior disabled.

The German fleet had been led to the British main battle fleet, but the latter had apparently come into action in rather a confused way.

From about 7 o'clock, followed by the four squadrons of British battleships, Sir David Beatty, with the three battle cruiser squadrons headed southeast, having the German fleet at the same disadvantage as von Spee had had Craddock off the coast of Chili, and for another hour the battle proceeded, when about 8 o'clock the German fleet, being outfooted and pressed to sea, seemed lost. Outnumbered and outclassed, it was suffering heavily, but it was handled with rare skill. With smoke palls and torpedo attacks, and aided by the mist, von Scheer worked hard to save the beaten fleet, which now for six hours had engaged the greatest navy in the world. The heavy fog at last shut out of view the fleets and the British admiral, Sir John Jellicoe, confined his search for his adversaries to torpedo attacks, which was perhaps a wise course, but, by the morning, no German ships were to be seen, and the battle was definitely ended.

As the result of this great battle, the British promptly admitted the loss of six ships, aggregating a tonnage of 104,700 tons, and mounting eight 13.5-inch, sixteen 12-inch and sixteen 9.2-inch guns. Their loss in personnel was two rear admirals, three or more captains and nearly six thousand and seamen. They also acknowledged that eight destroyers had been lost. The Germans at first only admitted the loss



of one battleship and four light cruisers, but subsequently declared that they had also lost a battle cruiser, the *Lutzow*, of 28,000 tons, previously denied for military reasons. All told, they put their loss at six ships and five destroyers, of an aggregate tonnage of 60,000 tons.

According to the British admiral, the German loss amounted to two battleships of the first class, two of the *Deutschland* class, one battle cruiser, five light cruisers, six destroyers and a submarine, in addition to many others damaged so seriously as to be useless for some time.

Until the actual loss of the German fleet is known, no accurate estimate of the result of the great battle can be arrived at. Yet, from what has been admitted, some deductions can be drawn. First, as the loss of the British in tonnage, guns and men was not, by any statement, twice as great as the German; while their strength as a navy, nearly three times as great, the Germans unavoidably suffered greater loss from the battle than the British.

Second, as the Germans did not hesitate to give an incorrect report, for military reasons, it is most reasonable to presume that their corrected report is still unreliable, especially when contrasted with losses, testified to as seen by the British.

Yet it is difficult to dispel the impression that the two German admirals handled their inferior fleet with greater ability than the British, and, if it is true, it is senseless to refuse to admit the fact. *Arbuthnot* and *Hood* may have shown great courage, but certainly not much ability. The British admiral in supreme command may have acted with the greatest discretion and exhibited wise caution, but one thing is apparent, when brought to him by his subordinate, he did not destroy the German fleet with the mighty flotilla under his command.

In conclusion, one odd fact stands out in the account of this "The Battle of Jutland, published by authority," and that is that the name of every admiral in high command appears save one, who, mentioned by Admiral Jellicoe in his official report, in the above escapes notice, and that, the admiral who, next to Beatty, had achieved the greatest distinction in the war. The name of Admiral Sir Frederick

Doveton Sturdee, leader of the Main Battle Squadron, victor of the smashing fight off the Falkland Islands, from which not a single German vessel engaged remained afloat, does not appear in this account "published by authority."

Greatly as England and all the world was stirred by this, the greatest naval battle of all time, yet it was not as impressive an event as the passing of that great soul, who, up to that time, had been Britain's greatest inspiration.

Von Moltke, the chief of the German staff, had been retired. Churchill and Tirpitz, heads of the respective navies of Great Britain and Germany, forced out of command, and others, like the Grand Duke Nicholas, commander-in-chief of all the armies of Russia, were, too, to relinquish their high control of the mighty agencies they had wielded. But Kitchener perished at sea, in the full blaze of completed work, just before the mighty instrument he had fashioned for Britain was about to make its immense influence felt upon the field of battle, in the tremendous struggle, he, alone, of all the great spirits of his day, had grasped the full significance of. Perhaps he was fortunate in his death, for the war which Lord Northcliffe was waging against him might have finally brought him down, as it did bring down the great Prime Minister who had appointed him and who would never have parted with him. So, dying as he did, with his great work complete, he passed away with more honor than any British soldier since the days of Wellington, and, in the estimation of the world, stands still as the most imposing figure of his period.

Meantime, Verdun, in its fourth month, had taken the heaviest toll of all from the Germans, as their casualty lists for May indicated 102,507 in all. Prisoners, as usual, below 2,000, but "missing," 6,771. Relief, however, was about to come to both French and Italians, for in the first days of June, with a rush, General Brusilloff struck the long line in the East, to which he was opposed.

From the city of Pinsk in the Pripet marshes, down to the Roumanian frontier, in five armies, under the supreme command of the Austrian Archduke Frederick, some six hundred thousand foemen were arrayed along the line they had held during the winter. These armies were commanded,

from north to south, by Puhallo, whose line reached from the Pripet marshes to Kolki, by the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand from Kolki to Dubno; from Dubno to Zalotste by Boehm-Ermolli; from the edge of the Galician border to the city of Buczacs, by Bothner, with a mixed German-Austrian force; while from there to the Roumanian border, General Pflanzer was in command.

General Brusilloff who, with Russky, had shared the distinction of smashing the first Austrian offensive in September, 1914, had succeeded General Ivanoff in command of one-half of the Russian line. Under him were four armies, the first of which, the army he had led in those former victories, now under General Kaledin. Below him came General Sakharov. Below him General Scherbachev. The lowest part of the line was under General Letchitski.

In eight days General Kaledin stormed his way forward fifty miles, capturing Lutsk and, with the assistance of General Sakharov, Dubno, and, in so doing, between them securing 70,000 prisoners and 53 guns, a rout sufficient to deprive the Archduke Frederick of his command, which was entrusted to a German general, von Linsingen, reinforced from the northern Russian line and from France, five army corps from the latter field being dispatched to stem the tide. South of where General Kaledin and Sakharov were operating, General Scherbachev was opposed to General Bothner, whose left wing he could not press back, although against the German general's right wing he was more successful. It was the hapless General Pflanzer who suffered most. Utterly routed he was chased out of Bukowina, the capital, and all the towns of which were occupied by General Letchitski; and with 198,000 prisoners, captured, also 219 guns and 644 machine guns, on the 1st of July General Brusilloff rearranged his lines just as the French and British offensive began on the Western front.

There General Foch commanded the French, General Haig the British, north and south of the River Somme and, after an extremely heavy bombardment of the German trenches, the two armies advanced. Steadily and pertinaciously they pounded the German trenches, moved up, drove back counter-attacks and methodically, step by step, advanced

with considerable losses, but an ever-increasing list of prisoners captured. It was not a battle in any respect like the great Russian offensive. It could not be, for Haig and Foch did not have Austrian commanders and polyglot armies to contend with, but were opposed to the very best that Germany could bring into the field in military force. It was the supreme test as to whether any troops could break the German line.

With its continuous hammer of heavy artillery, and its slow but continuous advance, at the end of the first month not as much territory had been recovered as had been seized by the Germans around Verdun; but that battle had been altered to a German defensive action. Continually described as a failure, yet steadily proceeding, the battle of the Somme required every effort of the Germans to hold the small portion of territory which jutted into France the farthest, and still, piece by piece, it left their control. On other fields the tide was turning also.

In German East Africa General Smuts was making steady progress. Separating the Germans near the ocean from the force which had been operating on Lake Victoria and Tanganyika, and pushing them down, he gradually surrounded them, and although the British force below Kut, on the Tigris, could not surmount that obstacle to an advance on Bagdad, yet in Armenia, above, the Grand Duke Nicholas was still advancing, something of a threat to the Turkish forces, between the two armies, which had pushed into Persia.

The failure of the Germans was marked by the removal of the talented Falkenhayne from supreme command and the elevation of General Hindenberg, the last hope of Germany.

The great war had certainly been the grave of reputations, military and political, and more yet were to be brought low, but the remark of the German politician, Zimmermann, that it was a day of small men, was but another indication of the inability of the clever German to see clearly.

That Asquith and Bethman Hollweg still rode such a storm was evidence of pre-eminent political ability, while

the fall of Sanzonoff and the elevation of Sturmer in Russia, a foreshadowing of the flexibility of the great German Chancellor, to whom it was apparent that there were more ways of winning a war than through the use solely of troops in the field, and, from him, now there began to issue intimations of what was designated "an honorable peace."

But to this suggestion Great Britain did not incline a gracious ear. In the first place, it was most indefinite and had only come when it was fully realized that the British Empire was gathering for an immense effort its full strength, now well in hand and capably led.

If she had as yet produced no soldier, who in the field could have been called a military genius; nor any comparable with Joffre or Hindenberg, Falkenhayne or Foch, or even Brusilloff, Sarraill or Russky; yet, in General Haig, she had a commander capable of handling effectively the vast numbers she could now put into the field, and this alone was a great advance, for the press failed to remember that in the Franco-Prussian war the great von Moltke only admitted that there was one French general capable of handling 200,000 men, and Haig was now directing more than half a million.

In the month that it had fought, Kitchener's army was a great surprise to the Germans, the artillery in particular being far beyond what the Germans had thought possibly could be produced in the period which had evolved it. In the opinion of Hindenberg, too, the infantry were "tough fighters," although, with regard to the leaders, the grim old German bluntly declared they "were not on the heights."

Perhaps it was just as well that they were not. Steady, methodical training in the field, under fire, would get them up to the French and German standard and possibly beyond. Just as the Federal armies rose to the highest efficiency under the stimulating influence of repeated combats with the Confederates under Lee and his lieutenants.

Those who failed to trust democracy under trial were too precipitate, the test was still to come. In two years a weapon had been forged by democracy which it took autocracy forty to finish to its satisfaction; now they were to be put in contest with each other.

Could autocracy or Teutonic efficiency point to any spectacle as impressive as that which liberal democracy revealed in the Boer general at the head of his British subordinates—Hoskins and Northey—and assisted by his South African lieutenant, Van de Venter, with half of German East Africa in his control, the railroad cut, Dar Es Salaam taken and the German force ringed around with British, South Africans, Rhodesians and Belgians?

To get the nearest parallel one had to hark back to American history and note the old Confederate Wheeler advising Shafter at Santiago.

No, after all, there was something in democracy and home rule that the Germans, with all their efficiency, could not understand, and the nearest that the brainiest of them could get to the realization was the mournful statement of the Prussian-American journalist, "Alsace has been nothing but a thorn in Germany's side."

Even the Italians, too, after a year of struggling in the terrific terrain, where the combat had been pitched for them, and in which they had been unable to do much more than hold upon the defensive, some 360,000 Austrians, for the last month or more had given occupation to double that number, to the great assistance of the Russians under Brusiloff, and now that to stop his forward movement, some of these were hurrying back to the Eastern front, the Italians put forth their greatest efforts along the line of the Isonzo River, and, carrying Gorizia by assault, drove the Austrian defenders out with a loss of 18,758 prisoners, 30 heavy guns, 62 pieces of trench artillery and 92 machine guns.

In the young German general, Gressman, the successor of Von der Golst, in Turkey, the Germans had a very capable soldier. He could not be everywhere, and the Turkish division, which again advanced against the Suez Canal, was repulsed with heavy loss, while what began to look very serious for Germany and Turkey in that direction, the revolt of the Arabs of Mecca and the driving of the Turks out of that city and Medina by the Grand Sheriffe of Mecca, aided and munitioned by the British, gave promise of big results, but still Gressman had stopped the advance of the British up the Tigris. He had driven the Russian general, Baratoff,

back as far as Hamadan, in Persia, which was again aflame, and he had captured Mush and Bitlis, in Armenia. The latter city, however, he was unable to hold very long, for the Russian general, Yudenitch, again occupied it, and the Turkish advance into Armenia was checked.

Again, whatever might be General Hindenberg's opinion of the British leaders, one thing was evident, through their own published lists, and that was a grapple with the British was always accompanied with a rise in the German casualties. In the month of July these had risen to 122,540, and, while the prisoners were, as usual, almost negligible the "missing" had gone up with a bound to 15,334. Impressed by the facts of the stoppage of the Verdun attack, the successful Italian advance, the steady beat of the Somme offensive, now continuing to the end of the second month with its steadily mounting list of prisoners and guns, but, above all, by Brusilloff's tremendous prisoner list, now announced as 300,000, together with 405 cannon and 1336 machine guns and a third of Galicia reoccupied, and with two passes in the Carpathians in his hands, the Roumanians now deemed Austria hopelessly broken, and hurriedly decided to intervene upon the side of the Entente and seize Transylvania, depending upon but a small force to hold the Dobrudscha.

It is possible that no matter how they might have planned their campaign, it may have resulted in failure, for they were neither well officered nor efficiently munitioned; but, had they stood upon the defensive at the passes into Transylvania and pushed with all their force into Bulgaria along the lines with which their troops had at least the knowledge, which had been acquired from their intervention in the Balkan war, they might have seized and cut the railroad connecting Berlin with Constantinople and effected a junction with Sarraïl and aroused Greece to strike for Kavala. Yet, if they had not succeeded in this, a failure to hold the passes to Transylvania would have exposed them to great risks in recrossing the Danube, and possibly the course they took after all was the most prudent, and at first they seemed to have scored some successes and taken some prisoners among their kinsfolk; but, in the Dobrudscha, from the outset, they were most unfortunate.

Under two of their ablest generals, the Germans prepared to meet this new foe.

In Transylvania the force under Falkenhayne fell back and drew the Roumanians on; in the Dobrudscha, under Mackensenn, with a succession of swift strokes, the Roumania defense crumbled. First, that last named general captured a whole division in garrison, and although separated by the Danube, yet, pushing up the Dobrudscha, got well behind the capital.

In Transylvania the city of Kronstaadt was captured and Hemannstadt threatened by the Roumanians, but the Russians did not seem able to break through the passes and join the Roumanians, and soon matters became so serious in the Dobrudscha that movement in Transylvania slowed down. There General Falkenhayne showed himself a general as able in the field as he had been as head of the staff. With a swift movement he crossed a range and, seizing a pass through which one of the Roumanian invading armies had come, captured its transport and forced it to the most desperate fighting to get back to Roumania. The force which had crossed into Serbia at Orsova also was unable to advance, and the invasion speedily was transformed into a desperate defense of Roumania itself.



## CHAPTER VI.

### THE EBBING OF THE TIDE

Despite the energy and ability with which the German Staff moved against the Roumanians during the month of September, the Somme offensive, with its steady, unending beat upon the German armies in the West was making itself felt. Kitchener's men were making good. By October 1st, 1916, the number of German military prisoners in England had risen from 15,000 to 36,894 and in addition there 2,120 German seamen. In comparison with this the Germans could only show 29,629 British soldiers and 408 seamen. The tide had turned, even if it was moving slowly and no two men realized it more thoroughly than the German Chancellor whose responsibilities were so tremendous and the wildly ambitious Crown Prince of Germany, who had not hesitated, just prior to the war, to do all he could to discredit the Chancellor in that official's efforts to hold the Civil above the Military authorities. In their two expressions of opinion, published just about this time, the temper of the two was manifested. To the Reichstag the Chancellor said:—

“The French and the British, it is true, have achieved advantages. Our first lines have been pressed back some kilometers, we have also to deplore heavy losses of men and material. That is inevitable in an offensive on such a mighty scale, but what our enemies hoped and strove for—namely, to break through on a grand scale and roll up our position on the West—has not been attained. Firm and unbroken stands our front. Heavy and hard is the battle out there on the Somme, nor is the end there in sight. It will cost further sacrifices. Still another and another village may be lost, but they will not get through. That is guaranteed by our leadership and the incomparable bravery of all the German tribes.”

After further allusions in which he laid all the blame for war upon the adversaries of Germany and pictured the Germans as fighting only to defend themselves, the Chancellor

declared:—"Therefore we were able first and alone to declare our readiness for peace negotiations."

The Crown Prince thus unburdened himself in an interview:

"Have you had a chance to see enough of this terrible business, or does your heart already ache enough over the sorrows which have descended upon this bad region of the earth? What a pity. 'What a pity it is.' All this terrible extinction of human life is belating the hope and expectancy of youth and mortgaging our energies and resources far into the future. It is not alone for German lives, for wasted German energies that we mourn. We are well able, at least, comparatively well able, to bear it. But all the world, including America, which has invested in the Entente's chances of success, will have to aid in footing the bill. That, of course, is one reason why the sympathies of your capitalists are with our enemies. Isn't there a book which says: Where the treasure is, there the heart is? It is a pity your treasure is not invested during these hours of world agony in sowing the seed of preparation for the fruits of peace; so your prosperity would rest in the great harvest which would follow the return to neutral conditions, rather than in the unhappy and uncertain fruit of war."

After bewailing the war and the frightful implements which the Germans were obliged to use in waging battle, this unfilial and disloyal son, who had done his utmost to maintain the ascendancy of the Military Party against the Emperor's Chancellor, especially in the matter of the Zaborn incident, by his gestures and applause in the Legislative body of the Empire, now inquired of the Panama Canal, declaring:

"I should like to know your Colonel Goethals, who has been fighting swamps and fever and sliding mountains. It is in that sort of enterprise that the world should find what one of your American philosophers, James, designated as the Moral Equivalent for War."

But the gist of what the Crown Prince thought was really contained in this:—"We are all tired of bloodshed. We all want peace."

Nor was it surprising; for, while the great bulk of the Austro-German loss in Galicia fell on Austria, 402,471 soldiers and 841 guns taken was an appalling enumeration of loss for the Russian front. In addition, Italy had captured 33,048 men and 36 guns and if of those surrendered to the Russians, only one-fifth of the prisoners were German; yet, in the steady beat of the Somme offensive, the entire loss was German and that, in the four months had yielded in capture 72,981 men and 303 guns and still was proceeding with no sign of let up. Roumania, it was true, was being overrun; but General Sarrail from Saloniki had pushed up into Macedonian Serbia, with his left wing at Monastir, there, in touch with the Italian right, extended from Avlona; and, from the Aegean to the Adriatic, a strong Allied force now barred the way of the Central Powers to Greece.

In the Turkish Asian fields, an English strategist of high rank now had the Mesopotamian Campaign well in hand; for in General Maude, who succeeded Sir Percy Lake, the British had at last a general who could turn to account the opportunities which might present themselves and surmount the difficulties of an advance up the Tigris.

In November, 1916, also occurred an event of great importance in the Western Hemisphere, the re-election of the great Peace President of the United States, whose election could not be considered a partisan triumph for the Democratic Party, as he had shown himself much stronger than his party.

Again and again had the leaders of his party united against his policies, but only to have them pushed to enactment, in spite of every effort which they could bring to bear against him. The combination of Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Hughes against him at the polls had been as fruitless; and, as a great world figure the firm, quiet, but persistent leader of the American people had become a mighty factor in the great world struggle. That he was going to intervene in some fashion, no one who had studied the man for one instant doubted; but, what the nature of intervention would be, was the great question.

Fully realizing the strength of the individual who had forced Germany to abandon her submarine policy or at least to conform its exercise to his ideas of how it should be conducted, the German ruler realized that the President of the United States could not be ignored, and, almost as if addressing him, the German Chancellor at once attempted the justification of Germany in the war.

The Somme offensive was still under way and still reaping its captures and, despite the fact that one-half of Roumania was now in the clutch of Falkenhayne and Mackensen, the blockade was pressing Germany sorely.

Worn with labor, age and sorrow, the Austrian Emperor passed away, leaving his Empire, racked and torn with war, a mere appanage to the mighty Ally, which had urged him to refuse the European conference, and backed his frantic invasion of Serbia, thereby inaugurating the world war, which was still raging after two years and four months of slaughter and devastation.

With allusions to "Peace Mongers" in the United States, the London Times now girded itself for a last effort to unhorse the Prime Minister of Great Britain and supplant him with that Liberal, upon whom the bulk of the Conservative leaders had centered, the energetic, resourceful, fearless Radical, Lloyd George, who had publicly declared England would regard any attempt at mediation as an unfriendly act.

Mr. Asquith went down and, after a brief and fruitless effort, upon the part of Mr. Bonar Law, the leader of the Conservative Party, Lloyd George was sent for and proceeded to shape a cabinet.

It seemed a time to take hold. Britain was at her strongest. Despite all the glamour which surrounded the triumphant march through two-thirds of Roumania, down to the Black Sea from Bukowina, the remaining third held back the invaders, and while the German Staff could still supply 4,400,000 men for their armies, the Austrians could no longer muster more than 2,180,000 men all told.

Against the French and English, whom they esteemed their most dangerous enemies, the Central Powers therefore opposed a force of 2,560,000 Germans, their best and bravest

troops. Against the Russians were lined up 1,300,000 Germans, 780,000 Austro-Hungarians and 40,000 Turks. Against the Roumanians 240,000 Germans, 220,000 Austrians, 80,000 Bulgarians and 40,000 Turks. Against the composite force of General Sarrail in Macedonia 60,000 Germans, 180,000 Bulgarians and 20,000 Turks. But this was not all; for there were probably at least as many Turks about and around Constantinople and some 300,000 or possibly 400,000 disposed against the Russians and British in their respective spheres in Asia.

As opposed to these, Great Britain and France, in all probability, arrayed 3,500,000 men on the Western front and Russia nearly as many on the East. General Sarrail had under his command possibly 360,000 men; but, in his rear, a disaffected government, Greece, which could put into line about as many. To the Italians, with a total near a million, pressing forward for Trieste, the Austrians barred the way with 660,000 men. In Egypt the British had a force of 180,000 men and up the Tigris General Maude was moving with 120,000 men to force Kut El Amara, defended by 80,000 Turks; while probably two other Turkish columns well into Persia opposing Russian armies, mustered between them 120,000 men.

Great changes in the high command had taken place. General Nivelle had succeeded the great Joffre and signalized his appointment with a blow, delivered at Verdun, resulting in the recovery of the most important part of the terrain in that neighborhood, won by the Germans in months of toil and bloodshed, now abandoned with 11,387 prisoners, captured by the French. Sir John Jellico had been relieved of the command of the Grand Fleet and, succeeded by Sir David Beatty; but that had not sufficed, Mr. Balfour, the First Lord of the Admiralty, had also given way to Sir Edward Carson, and had been assigned to the office of Lord Grey.

In Russia the changes were harder to understand, for while the German suspect, Sturmer, had given way to Trepoff, the latter had very shortly after resigned on account of a worse appointment even than Sturmer, Protopoff, and Trepoff had been replaced by Prince Golitzin, a reactionary,

about whom nothing else was known but that rather unfortunate characterization.

Before the new Prime Minister of Great Britain could well settle himself in place, the German Government, through its Chancellor, made direct overtures for peace, presented through the United States. The German Chancellor claimed:—

“The four Allied powers were obliged to take up arms in order to defend justice and the liberty of national evolution. The glorious deeds of our armies have in no way altered their purpose. . . . Our aims are not to shatter or annihilate our adversaries. In spite of our consciousness of our military and economic strength and our readiness to continue the war which has been forced upon us until the bitter end, if such be necessary, at the same time prompted by the desire to avoid further bloodshed and to make an end of the atrocities of war, the four Allied powers have proposed to enter forthwith into peace negotiations. The propositions which they bring forward for such negotiations, and which have for their object a guarantee of the existence, honor and liberty of evolution for their nations, are, according to their firm belief, an appropriate basis for the establishment of a lasting peace, etc.”

This declaration was a supreme test to those to whom it was addressed. What would be the reply of that Minister who was nearest to the position of head of the Entente?

Mr. Lloyd George had been raised to the exalted position in which he was on account of the possession of many sterling qualities of greatness; but if a position could have been conceived of peculiarly fitted for his great predecessor to fill, it was the one in which Mr. Lloyd George was placed. No man could have replied to the German Chancellor as effectively as the great Parliamentary leader, Mr. Asquith, unless possibly it was the President of the United States. There should have been absolutely no temper in the reply and from neither of these two would there have been such. The reply of either would have accentuated the fact that Germany was now asking for just what she had refused on England's request before the war and she would have been informed, that if she sincerely desired peace she should submit the terms which she desired considered. There should

have been nothing added to distract attention from the fact that the Entente would consider the proposals of peace when they were so formulated as to permit of intelligent consideration. It was the occasion for a cool and wary swordsman. It was not the time for an aggressive speech. There was no occasion to recite what Germany had done, the effort should have been made to force her to say what she wished to do. Unquestionably the speech of the Prime Minister was an able one; for he was an extremely able man; but while he declared:—

“We will, therefore, wait until we hear what terms and guarantees the German government offers other than those, surer than those which she so lightly broke”—

he prefaced it with what must have been meant for an insult even if the truth: “Meanwhile we shall put our trust in an unbroken army rather than in a broken faith.”

It was a brilliant speech and quite up to the best efforts of the speaker in a brilliant past; but, whether it was the best speech that could have been made upon the supreme occasion that called it forth was a question. In the minds of some, it suffered a little in contrast with the shorter and calmer speech of the Leader of the House, Mr. Bonar Law.

On December 20, 1916, President Wilson gave the world another surprise and some great men something of a shock, by calling upon both sides in the titanic struggle to state upon what terms peace could be arrived at.

To the forceful Lord Northcliffe, the uncrowned king of England, the inquiry was distinctly distasteful, and, in the press controlled by him, the charge was made that the speech played the German game. There were also hints that it would not be unnatural, remembering the attitude of America in 1863, to consider such suggestions unfriendly, and, as previous to this, *The London Times* had alluded, with some scorn, to what it designated as the efforts of “Peace Mongers in America,” some friends of the Allies were fearful that the strong man of Great Britain might force a rebuff to the President’s wise move. But the Prime Minister and the government were strong enough in this

instance to show that Lord Northcliffe's paper did not speak for the government, and replied in a document of great length, about which, whatever else might be the opinion, it could not be denied, it stated terms, and, as the German government could not bring itself to do this, the result was a distinct advantage to the Allies.

As the year 1916 closed, therefore, on the whole, the Allies appeared stronger than the Central powers.

If the entrance of Roumania was a blunder, as the new Prime Minister of Great Britain had declared, it was nevertheless a blunder which kept occupied 580,000 troops of the Central powers, which, if not so engaged, might have been most effectively used elsewhere.

If the Somme offensive had as yet yielded to the Allies not much more ground than the German offensive at Verdun, yet the loss by the Germans of 108,000 prisoners, 149 heavy guns, 200 field guns and 1,432 machine guns, was a loss not to be blown away in talk, and one which, coupled with the unascertained dead and wounded, was to compel the retreat which General Hindenberg later made, and which was to indicate that the Somme offensive meant a restoration of most valuable French territory and French people to France, nearly 1,000 square miles, which, up to that time, had been firmly held by the invader.

There were evidences also that a well thought out series of movements were under way to dispose of Turkey, which, under German guidance and organization, had proved a great asset to the Central powers.

Out of Egypt an expedition had moved and, on the eastern confines of the Sinai Peninsular, a Turkish force had been driven back with loss, while contemporaneously General Maude moved up against Kut El Amara and General Bara-toff pushed west from Hamadan in Persia.

In Macedonia General Sarrail had occupied some hundred or more square miles of Serbia, including the City of Monastir, and the Italians had made farther progress in Albania and on the Corso plateau and in the Trentino.

All told, in the year 1916, the Central powers had lost 582,423 prisoners, and, although the bulk of this loss was



undoubtedly suffered by Austria, yet, of her great armies Germany must have yielded up in the year over 200,000 in prisoners of war alone. As against these losses, the Germans had the splendid territory they had won in Roumania and the valuable booty and provisions there seized, the heartening of their allies by their splendid triumphs, the reassuring of Austria by the removal of the Roumanian menace and the establishment of a broader way to Constantinople and the great domain of the Turks.

Undoubtedly the prestige of Germany still stood high and again an opportunity had been extended to her for the statement of such terms as would have satisfied the great peace-loving republic of the West.

But Germany's triumphs had turned her head, and, in place of stating terms, she pinned her faith to the reactionary forces of Russia and the ravages of the submarine. These were undoubtedly strong cards, but if they failed to win and the use of them brought in the United States upon the side of the Allies, they would prove destructive.

If any one had failed to understand what the war had disclosed to careful students by this time, an authority now came forward to state the result.

Professor Friederich Meinecke, of Freiburg University, on the eve of 1917, published a resume and critique of the war. Extracts from the German professor's article, which appeared in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, sketched out the war as follows:

"Our first object was to overthrow France rapidly and to compel her to make peace. As it was our interest rapidly to reduce the number of our enemies this peace would probably have been very lenient for France. If we succeeded, we could then turn quickly, carry out the same military idea against Russia also, with the best prospect of success, and then, under favorable conditions, conclude the final peace with England, who would have been disarmed on the Continent. This peace also, like the first peace concluded with France, would have had to assume, in high degree, the character of a compromise, since we could not hope to overthrow England's naval supremacy. This whole programme, brilliantly begun, collapsed at the gates of Paris, in the Battle of the Marne. This battle was not a tactical victory, but it

was a great strategical success for the French. Perhaps our programme would not have collapsed if we had carried through our original strategical idea with perfect strictness, keeping our main forces firmly together and for the time abandoning East Prussia."

Professor Meinecke admitted, however, the failure of the German armies in the fall of 1914 and winter of 1915 to break through West and East in the bloody assaults at Ypres, and before Warsaw, but claimed that the French also failed about the same time in the Champagne, and certain it is that the great Joffre spoke of driving the enemy out by the end of 1914. Then came the German smashing of the Russian lines on the Danujec in May, which, despite all that they accomplished, ended again upon throwing them on the defensive as far flung as was their battle line, and this was followed by the failure of the French and British to break through at Loos and in the Champagne in the fall of 1915. Finally he revealed the secret of the attack upon Verdun, about which so many theories have been advanced. He said:

"The argument among us a year ago was that the decision must be sought not in the intangible distant East, but in the concentrated West, the nerve centre of the enemy's forces. The decision must not, however, be a decision in the old sense aiming at a break through and a rolling up of the enemy's resistance—for such a decision was regarded as no longer possible here in the West—but a decision better adapted to the experiences of the war of position and to psychological calculations. We should in fact break in at a particularly critical position, destroy one of the most important French fortresses, and so prove to the French that they could no longer win and they would do better to end a war which had lost all prospects for them. That was the origin of our undertaking against Verdun. But this time the new politico-military idea led only to an heroic episode. If our original successes could have been pursued at the same pace to their goal, our political purpose would perhaps have been attained. But meanwhile our enemies pulled themselves together for still more gigantic achievements. England learned from us universal military service and the conversion of industry for the production of a mighty supply of arms and ammunition. At the same time she leaned upon the industrial strength of America, and so, while Japan helped also, she was able to equip the new Rus-

sian formation with the apparatus which we had smashed the year before. Thus, in June and July, 1916, it came to the great double offensive of our enemies in East and West. The result was that we had to interrupt our operations against Verdun and the enemy offensive also achieved partial successes, especially in the East, although the real object—to break through and roll up our lines—could not be achieved, in spite of an intensity of attack and superiority in technical resources far greater than in our break through in Galicia. This was due to the fact that we, in the interval, had still further developed the possibilities of trench warfare.”

To the professor, the battle of the Somme had indicated that it was no longer possible to arrive at military decisions “in the full peace-compelling sense,” and that the sacrifices demanded by the war bore no relation to the military results which could at this last stage be achieved, and as a compromise, was all that could be attained, it was the part of statesmanship to seek it. In conclusion, he thought the “knock-out” policy did not pay, but that the smaller powers would learn from the war that they risked their lives when they touched the live wire which protected Central Europe.

In this extremely candid review there was a world of information, and it was indicative of Britain’s true greatness in the struggle. In two years, despite all manner of blunders, she had accomplished what Germany had prepared for in forty.

To Brusilloff and Joffre, and possibly to the forgotten Von Moltke, were, without name, assigned the honors of great military ability, although to whoever was responsible for the plan of the Danujec smash, great credit was also due. Professor Meinecke’s paper indicated a very thorough understanding of the Germans, their aims and their work, but, despite its admirable clearness and freedom from buncombe, it also indicated the utter inability of the Germans to understand other peoples, a condition of mind which all through the unhappy business was the real stumbling-block of the Germans. And, so, with a casualty list now mounting up to more than 4,000,000, the Germans entered upon the third year of the Great War.

## CHAPTER VII.

### THE SUBMARINE CHALLENGE

The slaughter caused by the Great War had now become so appalling, the misery and desolation so wide-spread and hideous, that, in spite of the fact that he had been warned that intervention might be considered unfriendly, in January, 1917, President Wilson felt impelled to intervene, and, in a speech to Congress, which seized and held the attention of the world, he stated that he had addressed an identical note to the governments of the nations at war, requesting them to state more definitely than they had done the terms upon which they would deem it possible to make peace. As he reported their answers:

“The Central powers united in a reply, which stated merely that they were ready to meet their antagonists in conference to discuss terms of peace. The Entente powers have replied much more definitely and have stated in general terms indeed, but with sufficient definiteness to imply details, the arrangements, guarantees and acts of reparation which they deem to be indispensable conditions of a satisfactory settlement.”

The theme of the speaker was a lasting peace among the nations of the earth, the foundations of which should be laid upon a new plan. He thought it inconceivable that the United States should take no part in such a great enterprise. While he stated that the Great War must first be ended before the plan of universal peace could be arranged, yet, he declared, that how the war should be ended would have much to do with the participation of the United States in the plan of establishing peace. Then he intimated that without America in, the plan could not hope for success. He was against a balance of power, but for a community of power. He derived great pleasure from the fact that the statesmen of both of the groups of nations arrayed against one another had declared it was not their purpose to crush their antagonists. As, in spite of their assurances, the implications

were not equally clear, he thought he would state what he interpreted them to be: "Peace without Victory."

With a most disquieting logic he indicated just what a peace with victory would mean. Something accepted under duress. He contended that only a peace between equals could last, and that there should be no difference between large and small nations. He held that mankind was looking for freedom of life, not equipoise of power. Lastly, he introduced the trenchant doctrine, that no peace could or ought to last which did not recognize and accept the principle that governments derived all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and, passing swiftly to a concrete case, he blandly assumed that everybody was committed to the view of an independent, united autonomous Poland. From this he passed on to the suggestion that every great people, struggling to a full development of its resources and its powers, should be assured a direct outlet to the great highways of the sea, and how this could be done was also suggested. From this to the limitation of armaments, the address proceeded, and in a half hour's speech, without a single extravagant word, in the midst of the greatest war of all time, with his peace ideals, he excited throughout the world a profound sensation.

Doubts and criticisms, of course, were expressed, but the great voices of the civilized world proclaimed that the speech must receive careful consideration.

Dropping any further reference to "Peace Mongers," *The London Times* of January 26, 1917, editorialized on "President Wilson on Universal Peace," and, while it did not accept his "Peace Without Victory" as the great desideratum and sought to entrench itself against such, behind the magic of Lincoln's name and the declaration that a peace with victory was as essential to the Allies as it had been to the United States in the sixties, yet it paid a great tribute to "the high and daring character of his pacifist ideals, together with the prudence and caution of his policy."

But the declaration was too dangerous for Germany to allow it to permeate her people. It was necessary to stop it at once, and within nine days from its promulgation, she answered it with the defiant declaration that she would

resume unrestricted submarine warfare. What Germany must have expected followed.

The President at once severed diplomatic relations with Germany and, in a most dignified and positive utterance to Congress, asserted his determination to call upon that body for power to protect the lives of all citizens of the United States which should be threatened in their "right to liberty, justice and unmolested life." His conclusion was most impressive:

"These are the bases of peace not war. God grant that we may not be challenged to defend them by acts of wilful injustice on the part of the Government of Germany."

Obscured for a moment by these great events in the centres of the world of thought, an important move in the Far East was brought to light, for in a sharp action, in which he succeeded in getting to the rear of the Turkish army in Mesopotamia and capturing some 1,995 prisoners, General Maude made the strong defensive position, Kut El Amara untenable, thereby forcing the Turks to hastily abandon it and retreat precipitately toward Bagdad, with the British in pursuit. While the number of prisoners taken in the assault and pursuit, 4,300, together with those captured in the earlier days of the siege of the winter, a total of 7,000, with the natural proportion of killed and wounded and guns and munitions captured or destroyed, did not indicate the rout claimed by the press; yet it was a pretty clear demonstration that the army of 80,000 which had so long barred the way to Bagdad could no longer do so and, also, if the Turkish columns which in the previous spring had pushed the Russians far back into Persia, did not immediately fall back, they were apt to be overwhelmed. This they at once proceeded to do before the advancing Russian detachments, and fast upon the heels of the flying Turks, General Maude's army of 120,000 men entered the great Eastern city of the Caliphs.

The capture and occupation of Bagdad by the British was a great gain and capable of a profound psychological effect upon the Eastern peoples, which the British general

utilized with admirable effect in his proclamation upon entering it. It only remained to add the Syrians to the Arabs and Armenians now protected against the Turks, and the dream of conquest from Berlin to Bagdad was broken. But to bring about a firm defensive against this, Russian action in Armenia was imperative.

In response to the insistent demand of Russia, the British admiralty had attempted to force the Dardanelles, what would Russia do now?

To discover the chance of Russian co-operation, the new British government had dispatched Lord Milner to Petrograd, who, upon returning, seemed under the impression that the commission not only had accomplished a great deal, but that what had been accomplished was largely "owing to the support of the Czar." He also confided to *The London Times* that "he had found no differences of opinion as to the war."

Following these rosy intimations, on the 16th of March appeared a rehash of the past in the report of the Dardanelles Commission, which, with some recitals of fact occupied itself, to a far greater degree in an apportionment of blame for the failure of what was now admitted to have been a brilliant idea. While giving the originator not one word of praise or commendation for such, upon him, Lord Kitchener and others sharp criticism was laid.

In the midst of a terrible war wherein, whatever his faults, his patriotism had been unquestioned, Mr. Churchill, out of office for a year, was savagely attacked by *The London Times* "as the public have rightly held, the prime mover in the Dardanelles adventure," by whose "suppression they were saved from a still more extensive disaster in the straits."

When it was recollected by some, as it was, that "the adventure" at the time it was undertaken, had been extolled by this same paper as "an example of far-seeing vision, of a kind which the Allies have hitherto too often lacked," the character of the paper and its influence was affected, and so, when the report was powerfully replied to by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Asquith in Parliament, in spite of the great Mentor's declaration that there was "nothing in Mr. Churchill's

or Mr. Asquith's speeches to offset the broad conclusions of the report," the government evidently thought otherwise, and hastily published addenda, in which the far-reaching effects of even the bungled attempt to utilize the conceptions of genius was unmistakably displayed.

But, in all fairness to *The London Times* and the power that controlled it, it should be admitted, that it was impartial in its attacks upon fallen greatness, for of that individual of whom a year previous it had asserted that his appointment as a Field Marshal in the British army was

"a happy compliment, not only to the part which his Imperial Majesty has played in the war, but also to the valor of his armies"—

And an honor "especially gratifying to all the Allied nations"  
it now declared—

"The discontent of the Russian Duma, the people and the army with the Imperial Government, for its incompetence, its corruption and lack of vigor in carrying on the war came to a head on Friday, March 9th, and after several hours fighting in the streets of Petrograd . . . the old regime fell, the Czar abdicated, a provisional government took up the reins of power and a new era opened for Russia."

As great Russia rocked in the balance, and her mighty potentialities seemed in danger of being lost to the Entente just when everything elsewhere was coming their way, not a few people began to realize that the loss of even a greater number of the obsolete ships, saved by the press from further disaster in the straits, had not prevented other and finer ships and more men being lost elsewhere without any shortening of the war, and that at the Dardanelles a great opportunity had been lost on account of a senseless clamor, to a great extent originating from personal prejudice.

As if to mark this, the second appointment since the ousting of Mr. Churchill from the admiralty, Sir Edward Carson, in reporting his own inability to materially reduce the ever growing toll of the submarines, publicly extolled the



services in the admiralty of the formerly severely criticised First Lord, in the abundant supply of war vessels.

What had the Allies gained by the subordination of what had so learnedly been called "the subsidiary campaign" to what had been declared was "the main campaign?"

A slaughtering push by Haig and Nivelle against Hindenberg on the one side and the submarines and famine against the world's shipping on the other. Had the Dardanelles been forced, which they well might have been, with but a part of the terrific loss so valiantly sustained in France, it would have been possible to have brought out the wheat of Russia by such a route as to make it almost immune to submarine attack, and it would have been impossible to have crushed Great Britain by famine, as long as she could have held Russia to the war. Now, without the intervention of the United States, the Allies would be obliged to come to terms with Germany and the submarine menace. And, as if to aid in the suggestions for a peace conference, a most peculiarly worded, apparent news item, was issued by the Associated Press. Up to its appearance, the casualties reported in the German lists had been accepted as a basis of loss, and these up to February, 1917, put the same at 988,328 German dead, 247,991 prisoners, 276,278 missing, 2,575,094 wounded, a total of 4,087,692. Now, allowing that on account of superior medical and surgical skill, 60 per cent. of the wounded Germans returned to the colors, as against 50 per cent. of French and British, these lists published in Germany, seemed to indicate that Germany's force of soldiery had been reduced by the loss in killed, captured and maimed, of fully 2,800,145 men.

The paper prepared by the Associated Press, and published as news, however, indicated two weeks later a very different condition of affairs. Not revealing whence its figures came, the Associated Press item from Washington, March 11th, asserted:

"More than 10,000,000 men are reported as killed, wounded or captured or missing in the first completed tabulation of official and authentic reports of the various belligerents received here."

Then followed a statement indicating 4,441,200 reported dead, 2,598,500 wounded and 2,567,500 missing or captured, or exactly 9,607,200, in place of the 10,000,000.

The list was apportioned between the Entente and Central powers in the following proportions: Entente losses, 6,318,400; Central powers, 3,384,800.

Evidently 96,000 had been thrown in somewhere as "good measure."

Distributed among the various nationalities, this amazing "news item" proclaimed for Russia a loss of 3,084,200, of which 1,500,000 were dead, 784,200 wounded, and 800,000 prisoners and missing. Next came France with a total loss of 1,810,800, of which 870,000 were dead, 540,800 wounded, and 400,000 prisoners or missing.

Naturally, one would suppose, in a news item, that the next power would be the one with the next highest loss.

Not at all.

England was placed right next to France, almost as if to make the contrast, and her total losses were put at 515,400, of which 205,400 were dead, 102,500 wounded, and 107,500 captured or missing. Roumania, although only engaged for six months, had her losses in that brief time put at what was nearly 50 or 75 per cent. of all the soldiery that she could possibly have mustered, or 500,000, of which only 100,000 were dead and 150,000 wounded, but 250,000 were put at captured and missing. Italy's losses were put at 209,000, of which 105,000 were dead, 49,000 wounded, and 55,000 captured or missing. Belgium's losses were put at 112,000, of which 50,000 were dead, 22,000 wounded, and 40,000 captured or missing. With regard to Serbia, the total was not asserted, but her dead were put at 60,000 and her wounded at 28,000.

Taking up, then, the losses of the Central powers, the statement was that "the total 'casualties' of Germany are 1,585,200, or, as was most unnecessarily stressed, '225,000' less than France's. Her dead come to 893,200, which is slightly higher than France's (a feeble attempt to appear impartial), while her wounded are set at 450,000 and her captured and missing 245,000, proportionately the lowest of the nations."

And this, when the German lists themselves showed that the German dead exceeded the above by 105,000, that the captured were 247,000, and that, in addition, 276,000 unaccounted for were marked as missing. In all, 378,000 admitted as gone, but absolutely wiped off in the above, which, when restored to the count, as is at once apparent, put Germany's loss even by this calculation, 1,963,253, to France's 1,810,800.

But to expect any one to believe that of every 100 Germans wounded, 90 returned to active service, while of all the other nationalities the return was exactly 80 out of each 100 wounded, is an absurdity; for it is an assertion not only that French, English, Russian, Austrian, Belgian and Turkish surgeons and hospital equipment were on an exact par; but that to every one, each of these cured, the Germans invariably cured two.

In spite, therefore, of all the soothing argumentative statements which accompanied this extraordinary publication, it was patent that it had been prepared to effect, if possible, the imagination of the newspaper public and to convince all of the utter hopelessness of any further contention with this modern Antæus.

One thing, however, its publication unavoidably indicated to all who believed it and investigated it, and that was, that if 450,000 represented that proportion of the wounded beyond even the curative power of German skill, and that 90 per cent. of the originally wounded had been completely cured, then 4,500,000 had certainly originally been wounded, and even if the investigator was willing to believe that the number alleged in the German list as dead, 988,328, was incorrect, and the number now given—893,200—was correct, and, in addition to the 247,000 captured, the 276,000 previously reported as missing was imaginary, and the number of captives actually only 245,000; yet, still, the number of wounded originally made the number of her casualties during the war just about 1,500,000 more than she had reported, or 5,638,200.

From all of which about the only reasonable conclusion which could be drawn was that the frightful effort to secure "her place in the sun" had cost Germany 2,634,000 killed,

mained and captured, of whom 521,000 had been saved from a harder fate by such capture, but over 2,000,000 had been unavailingly sacrificed to ambition.

Meanwhile, soberly, calmly and deliberately, the great Peace President of the United States called upon Congress to assert, not the physical might of the nation; not to seek revenge, but to grant him power to curb the submarine menace that threatened humanity. As he detailed his efforts the truth of his claim was evident. Every course save one had been tried. The path of submission alone he could not take. He advised, therefore, that the United States should formally accept the status of a belligerent, which had been thrust upon it, and that it should take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defense, but also exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the government of the German Empire to terms and to end the war. The object of the war, he thought, should be made clear to the world:

“—to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world, as against selfish autocratic power, and to set up amongst really free and self-governed peoples of the world, such a concert of the world, such a concert of purpose and action as will henceforth ensure the observance of these principles.”

The President went further than this. He said:

“We have not quarrelled with the German people. We have no feeling towards them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their government acted in entering this war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval. It was a war determined upon, as wars used to be determined upon in the old unhappy days, when people were nowhere consulted by their rulers and wars were provoked and waged in the interests of dynasties or little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use their fellowmen as pawns and tools.”

Then followed his indictment of the German government in filling the United States, a friendly nation, with spies and plotters against our laws, and attempting to stir up Japan and Mexico against us. His conclusion was a fitting perora-

tion to the highest appeal that has ever been made for war:

"Civilization itself seems to be in the balance; but right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts—for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own government, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for the universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as will bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world at last free."

The American correspondent of *The London Times* praised "Mr. Wilson's skill and audacity, in boldly driving a wedge between the German people and the German government;" but while the paper gave the speech generous praise, this part it could not consider other than as "a politic profession." And in this estimate *The London Times* was no doubt sustained by the Prussian Junkers, the great German captains of industry and the learned professors of that realm, but the common people heard him gladly, for they knew that just before the war, through the restricted representation, that the government had permitted them, they had implored it to accept the suggestion of a concert of Europe, urged by Sir Edward Grey and that Karl Liebknecht, the truest representative of the masses, had continued those protests until he had been jailed. That war once declared, they had fallen into line was as natural as that people of the stamp of Lord Northcliffe had paid the taxes which Mr. Asquith's government had imposed, while continuing to protest against it also, and to agitate to obtain one more to their liking.

The speech made a profound impression throughout the world. It brought from Congress an overwhelming declaration for war. It did more, it brought the people of the United States together more effectively than any other mode of procedure could have done. In one powerful utterance, the greatest intellect of the Republican party, Mr. Root, disposed of all talk of a coalition government, while Mr. Wilson's last opponent for the presidency, Mr. Hughes, modestly, forcibly and magnanimously proclaimed it "matchless."

So into the Great War the Great Republic swung.

Germany had had the chance offered her, with exemplary patience and forbearance, to select which she would take, unrestricted submarine warfare and the United States as an enemy, or restricted submarine warfare and the United States as a friend, and she, or her junkers and capitalists for her, had deliberately chosen the former. She had refused to state the terms upon which she would discuss peace, although implored to do so by a large portion of the representatives of those she was sending to death and destruction on the claim that she was waging a defensive war. There was but one explanation of the attitude of her government. It stood for "WORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL."















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